The
Malay States Guides in action at Hatum, Aden,
12th January 1916
Old
Aden like a
barrick-stove, that no one’s lit for years an’ years! (1)
Aden
in 1916
When Britain
declared war on Turkey on
5th November 1914 two fronts were opened between Turkish and British forces –
Sinai and Yemen.
British-controlled Aden had a border with Yemen that had been successfully demarcated in
1904, (See HERE)
but the declaration of war raised concerns about the security of the strategic Aden port because a Turkish Army Corps was stationed in Yemen, and the Turks might choose to attack Aden to disrupt Britain’s
vital sea route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Aden was
garrisoned by a weak British brigade, commanded from India,
that Britain was reluctant
to strengthen because of the urgent need for troops in France and Egypt. (see HERE) Britain
decided not to display aggression towards Yemen
but to treat Aden
Harbour as a ‘defended
port.’ Whilst this strategy conserved British military manpower it also lowered
British prestige in the hinterland, and handed the Turks an opportunity to
cajole and coerce Arab tribes in the interior to join the Turkish cause that
had been proclaimed as a jihad or
holy war.
However the presence of the 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H.V. Cox, CB, CSI, aboard a
naval convoy on its way to Egypt,
allowed offensive action to be taken by the British on 10th November 1914, and
the Turkish post at Sheikh Saad was attacked.
The landing party, well supported by the Royal Navy, drove off the
Turkish defenders, captured six guns and other important equipment and
destroyed the enemy entrenchments, wells and magazines before re-embarking for
Egypt and then Gallipoli, minus the 23rd Sikh Pioneers who now strengthened the
Aden garrison.
In mid-1915 the Turks stirred up trouble
amongst tribes in the Aden
hinterland, threatening the friendly Sultan of Lahej. A British column was despatched to Lahej but
numerous difficulties, not the least being the deadly summer heat and the
breakdown of the water and ammunition transport arrangements due to the
desertion of local drivers, led to a disorganised British retreat to the Khor
Maksar lines outside Aden. Sheikh Othman was abandoned to the Turks who,
fortunately for the British, chose to halt there.
Right: Malay States Guides
In early 1915 a few reinforcements had
trickled into Aden but now the subject was
addressed with more vigour and the 28th (Frontier Force) Brigade arrived from Egypt, and Major-General Sir George Younghusband,
KCIE, CB, was sent to take command in Aden. He quickly and correctly appreciated that, if
the Turks were expelled from Sheikh Othman, then Aden port could be defended by a small
British force. On 21st July a Frontier Force Brigade column attacked and seized
Sheikh Othman after a sharp fight. One
month later another small column pushed the Turks out of Fiyush, from where the
enemy withdrew to Lahej; and on 28th August the Frontier Force Brigade went out
to reconnoitre Waht where it punished a superior Turkish force who tried to
follow up the British retirement too closely.
As the climate in September was still too
hot for long operations, and because the security situation appeared to be
under control, Younghusband departed, handing over command in Aden to Brigadier-General C.H.U. Price, CB,
DSO. The Frontier Force Brigade also returned to Egypt
minus the 62nd Punjabis who stayed on in Aden.
In October the Malay States Guides arrived to join the Aden garrison.
As Younghusband had made Aden port safe,
Price was left to practise a policy of ‘active defence’ that involved the rapid
mobilisation of garrison units to form a Moveable Column that could deploy for
very limited periods to deter further Turkish advances. Against light opposition, such as raiders, a
smaller ‘Flying Column’ could be put into the field more rapidly. The British infantry and cavalry could match
the enemy forces in short actions, but the Turks possessed more artillery and
so the British had to be careful in choosing their battlefields and in the
tactics that they used. However the
factor that determined the length of an operation was water, as the Turks had
the advantage of sitting on the desert wells of their choosing. The British could only stay in the field as
long as their camel convoys could bring forward sufficient water for men,
horses, mules and camels.
The Malay States Guides
In Malaya the states of Perak, Pahang,
Selangor and Negri Sembilan were in 1895 formed into a confederation titled the
Federated Malay States; these states were
independent and ruled by their Sultans but they accepted British advice and
protection. The federation treaty with Britain
required the states to maintain a military force at the expense of the state
governments and rulers. State Military
Police units, mainly recruited from the Indian Punjab, had been performing
useful security roles in Perak, Selangor and Pahang and these units were
consolidated into the new military force titled the Malay States Guides that
was headquartered in Taiping. The
responsibility of the Malay States Guides was the internal defence of the
Federated Malay States, but by treaty in time of emergency the unit could be
used for the defence of Singapore. Service elsewhere in the world appears not to
have been mentioned in the federation treaty or in the soldiers’ contracts of
service.
Above: A Malay States Guides group
The Malay States Guides recruited Sikhs,
Punjabi Muhammadans and Pathans from India
and also locally in Malaya. The recruits from India
were referred to the unit by existing members returning from leave in the Punjab. The British
officers came from the Indian and British armies and Indian officers received
commissions from the Governor of the Straits Settlements. Maxim machine guns were issued to infantry
companies and an artillery battery was armed with mule-packed mountain guns. The service of all
Indian ranks was pensionable, and after some uncertainly as to whether, as
‘colonial’ troops, they might be entitled to
British awards including
the Distinguished Conduct Medal and
the Military Medal, it was resolved in
July 1916 that Indian awards would be more
suitable, in the form of the Order of British India, the
Indian Order of Merit, and the Indian Distinguished Service
Medal. The rationale was influenced by the fact that during
WW1 the Malay States Guides was
integrated, albeit pro tem, with Indian
formations within the
orbit of Simla and the Government
of India. As with personnel of both British
and Indian armies,
they were also eligible for the Victoria Cross and the
Military Cross. (2) Tall men were recruited and all ranks wore
splendid uniforms when on ceremonial parades, to the delight of the Sultans and
spectators. However more time was spent
drilling for parades
than was spent on training
in the field for war, too much time in barracks led to over-indulgence in
alcohol by some castes leading to consequent disciplinary problems. Some of the European officers were of
indifferent quality, a few of them not even speaking Urdu, the command
language. Thus power was consolidated in
the hands of the Indian officers who were notorious both for indulging in
intrigues often relating to caste, and in operating lucrative local businesses
– private transport-carting being a popular commercial activity throughout the
unit. Thus lack of firm and
inspirational leadership, professional direction and internal discipline,
sullied what should have been a fine and impressive operational regiment.
Above: MSG leave Malaya for Aden
The infantry establishment of the Guides
called for three double companies: one
of Manjha Sikhs, another of Malwa Sikhs, and a third of Punjabi Muhammadans and
Pathans. A depot company trained recruits and specialists.
The artillery establishment, a mountain battery,
was equipped with four 10-pounder mountain guns carried on mules purchased in North China, although there were insufficient numbers of
mules for all four guns. Of the two
sections in the battery one was composed of Sikhs and the other of Punjabi
Muhammadans and Pathans.
The Commandant’s report for 1913 showed that
the Malay States Guides was up to strength
An important non-military duty of the unit
was to supply the Fire Brigade for Taiping town with equipment provided by the
Perak Government. Despite using 1902-pattern rifles the unit
marksmanship results were satisfactory. The establishment of thirty qualified
signallers with requisite equipment was complete. A further thirty-five men
possessed signalling certificates. All
Indian ranks had received an increased pay award on 1st January 1913. The Malay States Guides was, in theory, ready
to go to war.
Above: Malay States Guides on parade before the Great War
Great War mobilisation, refusal to serve overseas, and
the Singapore Mutiny
The Malay States Guides mobilised for war on 6th August 1914, and all
men on leave in India
were recalled. Two days later special trains and boats took the men to Singapore where
they satisfactorily performed routine security duties. But the regiment had
been selected for service in East Africa
alongside Indian Expeditionary Forces ‘B’ and ‘C’. When preparations for the move to East Africa
began the Indian officers and rank and file refused to embark, stating that
their contracts did not specify service outside Malaya.
This action shocked the British military
establishment and also exposed the lack of knowledge of the British regimental
officers about the concerns and intentions of their own soldiers. Initially
disbandment of the regiment was proposed but wiser councils ordered a return of
the infantry to Taiping where, after reflection on both sides, new contracts
including provision for overseas service were offered and accepted by all
ranks. The mountain battery was retained
for duties in Singapore.
On 15th February 1915 a mutiny broke out in Singapore
involving half of the 5th Light Infantry, an Indian Army regiment. Around a dozen of the Malay States Guides
gunners joined the mutineers and the battery commander, Lieut. M.F.A. Maclean, (3)
was shot dead on the 5th Light Infantry parade ground. However the remainder of the battery remained
loyal and distanced itself from the mutiny, which was by now becoming bloody
and brutal, by marching out of Singapore
under its senior Indian officer to the adjacent Malay state of Johore, where
all ranks were disarmed.
After an enquiry had cleared them of any
association with the mutiny, the loyal gunners were re-armed and returned to
duty. Later in 1915 an insurrection broke out in the Malay state of Kelantan
and ‘A’ company of the Malay States Guides infantry was sent there. (4) The single-company was increased in size to
around 200 men by attachments from other companies. The Guides moved up the
coast by boat to make a beach landing, successfully defending their camp from
an insurgent night attack; next day an enemy group, poorly armed with old
muskets, was caught in the open and the Guides were able to kill and wound
several insurgents. Hard jungle patrolling then became the norm for a few
months until the last of the insurgents had surrendered or been killed. The
Guides suffered only one casualty when a soldier drowned in the Kelantan River. It was then decided to send the
regiment to join the Aden Field Force.
Above: The Malay States Guides 1906 Bisley Team
Aden
After being inspected by the General Officer
Commanding Troops, Straits Settlements, the Malay States Guides embarked on the
transport ship Arankola and sailed
for Aden on
26th September 1915. A port call was
made at Colombo, Ceylon, where the regiment went on
a route march. Three machine guns and two tripods were issued at Colombo by the Army
Ordnance Department. Aden
was reached on 9th October and the regiment disembarked with the following strength:
Artillery (Mountain Bty) British officer
1
Indian officers
3 rank and file
106
horses 5; mules 47
Infantry
British officers
9 Indian officers
12 rank and file
536
Temporary Lieut.-Colonel C.H.B. Lees, 53rd
Sikhs, Frontier Force, was the regimental commandant. The subedar-major was Jag Singh. Other British officers named in the war diary
at this time were:
Temp. Maj. C.E. Borton, 129th Baluchis (2-i-c)
Capt. W. Leslie, R.G.A., cmdg artillery
Captain T.B. Minniken, 76th Punjabis
[Capt. G.F. Turner, 82nd
Punjabis (5), Captain P.T. Blanford, 84th Punjabis,
* Captain Anderson,
* Lieutenant V.C. Upton,
* Lieutenant F. Golding,
* 2nd Lieutenant A.F. Hayward,
2nd Lieutenant L.C. Pearson, I.A.R.O. (6),
* Captain Wood (Medical Officer)
( * The identity of these
officers has not been established.)
The Guides were immediately allocated a sector
of the Sheikh Othman defence line, relieving the 56th Punjabi Rifles (Frontier
Force), who departed for Egypt. The companies were employed on manning static
defence picquets by day and night, learning desert entrenching and wiring
skills under Captain C.F. Stoehr of the 3rd Sappers & Miners, practising
field firing under Major Borton, and taking part in minor tactical manoeuvring
against Turkish intrusions near Sheikh Othman.
There were regular arrests of local and Somali women suspected of
spying, and night patrols attempted to apprehend enemy agents signalling from
the minarets of mosques and other high places in Sheikh Othman. The effects of the exposure to the dry, hot
and harsh climatic conditions in Aden
gave rise to dysentery-types of sickness throughout the unit until the
soldiers’ bodies, diets, and drinking habits had adjusted to their unaccustomed
environment.
Above: MSG Artillery firing in Aden
The mountain battery wished to train for mobile operations but more
mules and drivers were needed if four guns were to be deployed in a Mobile Column. Army HQ in India stated that no more resources
were available and so the battery reduced its mobile element to one section of
two guns. Even so, compared to Indian
Army establishments there was still a deficiency of thirteen drivers, nine
mules, three syces and four ponies. The
other two guns were positioned in the Sheikh Othman defence line.
Those men that marched outside the British
defence line found the terrain to be rolling country consisting mainly of sand
dunes, with patches of dense camel-thorn and scrub and every now and then a
solitary tree or group of ruined buildings. A skilful Turkish commander, Said
Pasha, operated from Lahej with 2,300 Turkish soldiers, 650 local Arabs and
Somalis, and nineteen artillery pieces.
Said Pasha maintained picquets on wells and vital ground features and he
could reinforce threatened locations quickly.
The Moveable Column
In early January 1916 reports came into Aden
Headquarters suggesting that Said Pasha was extending his influence over former
friendly tribes to the east of Aden.
A decision was taken to counter this by mounting a demonstration against the
Turks picqueting the important Hatum Ridge. A manoeuvre was planned that was
intended to entice the enemy into an inopportune counter-attack across open
ground where he could be punished by the British artillery. The Malay States
Guides were selected to play the leading role in this manoeuvre. The regiment
would be the decoy that attracted the Turkish counter-attack. On 11th February
orders were issued for the immediate formation of a Moveable Column whose
fighting units were:
Cavalry HQ and two Squadrons 26th (King George’s Own) Light
Cavalry The Aden Troop (circa 100 cavalrymen seconded
from the Indian Army)
Artillery 15-pndr Camel Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery
(six guns)
10-pndr Camel Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery
(two guns)
1/4th Hampshire (Howitzer) Battery
(four 5-inch howitzers)
Malay States Guides Mountain Bty (one section of
two 10-inch guns)
5-inch Breech Loading Battery, R.G.A. (one
5-inch heavy gun)
Engineers
No 5 Company, 1st
Sappers & Miners
No 23 Company, 3rd
Sappers & Miners
Infantry
1/4th Buffs (East Kent
Regiment) - one coy
126th Baluchistan Infantry - four coys
23rd Sikh Pioneers
Malay States Guides – infantry element
109th Infantry
The Imad Levy (local irregulars)
All the nominated units were ordered to
leave behind specific numbers of men in order to maintain the Sheikh Othman
garrison at a respectable strength.
Medical support was provided by two Indian Sections and one British
Section of the Combined Field Ambulance stationed at Sheikh Othman. Each unit was to set up its Regimental Aid
Post 100 metres behind the firing line, commanded by the unit Medical
Officer. Casualties for evacuation then
had to be carried to the Dressing Station in the rear from where they would be
evacuated by Desert Carts with canvas covers to Sheikh Othman; there casualties
were to be taken over by No.10 Stationary Hospital and moved by motor ambulance
to the base hospital in Aden.
The
18th Mule Corps deployed all its animals to provide transport support for the
operation and the 56th Camel Corps provided camels. The Ammunition and Supply
Columns were ordered to base themselves at Sheikh Othman and to send forward requested
supplies from there. To prevent noisy activity from compromising the operation
detailed instructions were issued to units on such subjects as pre-breaking the
seals on ammunition containers and oiling their retaining clips. Visual signalling was to be used on the
operation with Dar Al Amir being the central Visual Signalling Station, but the
HQ Cable Section was to lay cable for the column commander to maintain
telephone communications with Aden. The route was to be picqueted as far as Robat
by the Sheikh Othman garrison; after Robat picqeting duties were the responsibility
of the Moveable Column commander, Brigadier-General W.C. Walton.
Hatum
The Malay States Guides was the advance
guard, marching out at 02.15 hrs, 12th January 1916, and reaching the Hatum
area, about ten kilometres distant, at dawn.
The regiment then acted as a protective screen for the main body that
entrenched a position behind the screen.
Elements of the column (the 26th Cavalry, Aden Troop, a Sharpshooter
detail, the Buffs machine gun company and the Imad Levy) marched to Fiyush to
reconnoitre that area but maintained close contact with the troops at
Hatum.
Colonel Lees deployed his Nos I and II
double-companies forward, keeping No III double-company in reserve. No. 5 Coy Sappers & Miners supported the
Malay States Guides throughout the day. The artillery battery commanders went
forward to reconnoitre. Around 07.00 hrs
the Turks noticed the British movements and commenced shelling the area where
Nos I and II double-companies met. The
shell-fire searched the area with shrapnel; the Turkish range and fuze settings
were accurate and the guns appeared to be concealed behind Subah. Luckily for
the Guides and the Sappers & Miners the Turkish artillery observers could
not see exact targets and so the enemy guns continued to search with fire
rather than engage specific groups of men with concentrations of fire.
Above: Hatum Ridge
The enemy shelling
intensified around 08.30 hrs and the Turks then moved forward to attack, coming
to within 550 metres of the Guides’ positions.
The Guides had been sheltering from enemy observation behind a low ridge
but now they had to come onto the crest of the ridge to engage the enemy with
rifles and machine guns. The Turkish
artillery observers could now see them and accurate fire came down causing
casualties. As more Turkish troops
appeared to his front Colonel Lees started to withdraw at around 09.30 hrs; the
Guides withdrew 400 metres and took up new fire positions. During this withdrawal the British guns concentrated fire on the presumed enemy
artillery locations, neutralising their activities whilst the Guides scrambled
back with their casualties.
Half an hour later Colonel Lees noticed that
the number of enemy infantry to his front had diminished and so he advanced
again, but this time about 700 metres forward, driving enemy skirmishers before
him. The Guides were again exchanging
rifle fire with the enemy, and attracting accurate Turkish artillery fire that
caused further casualties. As an enemy
attack was now predicted, the British artillery batteries came into
action. The 15-pndr camel battery stayed
in the rear, using three positions from which it gave very effective fire
support to the Guides. However the 1/4th
Hampshire (Howitzer) Battery and the Malay States Guides section of 10-pndr
guns deployed forward in an attempt to see the attacking enemy troops. Much sand was blowing in the air, reducing
visibility, and the guns of the Hampshires and Guides guns came into action to
a flank but forward of the Guides infantry.
These two units attracted heavy enemy rifle fire and Captain William Leslie,
the Guides Battery commander, was shot off his horse by a bullet to the head
that killed him instantly, at which point Jemadar Sawan Singh took command. The Hampshires’ and Guides’ guns were then
re-deployed to come into action further to the rear.
Around noon the situation had become very
unpleasant for the Guides and Colonel Lees commenced a tactical withdrawal
starting with his right flank that was now being enfiladed by the enemy. The Turks then built up
strength in front of the Guides left double-company and the company commander
was ordered to make a fighting withdrawal.
Colonel Lees concentrated his men on the screening positions that they
had first occupied at dawn, and halted the Turkish advance. The 10-pndr Camel Battery was used in direct
support of the Guides now and its fire effectively deterred a Turkish
attack. After ninety minutes of fighting
from the screening position, the Guides left flank was being turned again and
Colonel Lees withdrew his three double-companies and the Sappers & Miners
into the main position at 14.30 hrs, where the Guides role was taken over by
the 126th Baluchis, the Guides going into reserve.
Meanwhile the cavalry had been tasked to get
behind the Turkish left flank and disrupt enemy activities; however the enemy
artillery fire directed against it was so effective that the mission could not
be achieved, and the cavalry was shelled out of each area that it
occupied. At 15.00 hrs the Turks
attacked the 126th Baluchis but a double-company of the 109th Infantry moved up
in support and the attack failed.
Thirty minutes later Brigadier Walton
decided that his Moveable Column had achieved all that it reasonably could do,
and he called-in the Fiyush elements and ordered a return to Sheikh
Othman. This decision was no doubt
influenced by the aggressive and courageous actions of the enemy infantry and
horsemen, the accuracy of the Turkish guns and the proximity of nightfall which
would have been of more benefit to the enemy that to the Moveable Column. Overnight the column would have had to stay
in an entrenched square formation, taking casualties from both artillery
shrapnel and the small-arms fire of Turkish raiding parties.
The Mobile Column withdrew in good order;
another enemy attack was repulsed at 16.30 hrs but after that the Turks were
disinclined to follow-up the British withdrawal. The Malay States Guides covered the
withdrawal supported by the Sappers & Miners and the company of 1/4th
Buffs, and at 22.15 hrs that night the Rear Guard arrived back at Sheikh
Othman.
Above: British cavalry on a Turkish observation post at Hatum
The cost
The Malay States Guides infantry had fired
16,574 rifle and machine gun rounds in action and the section of guns had fired
191 rounds of shrapnel; the regiment had been blooded on the battlefield and
had come through the action very creditably, as Brigadier General Price told
the unit when he later congratulated them.
Throughout a difficult day’s fighting in the desert the Guides’ internal
administrative systems worked well; orders were issued and executed, casualties
were evacuated, signals were sent and received, ammunition and water was moved
forward when needed, and all of this was performed whilst under effective enemy
fire. Said Pasha had been shown that a
British column could swiftly come out from Sheikh Othman to operate and cause
the Turks attrition when they attacked.
The local tribes had been shown that whilst the British could not defeat
Said Pasha, neither could he defeat the British. However it has to be said that Said Pasha
would not have been disappointed at the result of the engagement. He had seen-off a British column and the poor
visibility had prevented the British artillery, which fired a total of 1,138
rounds, from inflicting too many casualties on his attacking infantry and
horsemen. (7) But a price had been paid by the Guides.
Above: Tablet in All-Saints Church, Taiping
William Leslie was the sole casualty
suffered by the Guides artillery, (8) but the Guides infantry had lost three men and an attached mule driver killed
and two more men who died of wounds. Two
Indian officers and six men were seriously wounded and one British officer and
thirteen men were less seriously wounded.
Five mules and one horse were also wounded. The Malay States Guides casualties were:
Killed In Action Captain William Leslie, Royal Garrison Artillery, att’d
MSG; 1855 Sepoy Kehar Singh; 1542 Lance Naik Isar Singh; 1115 Driver Gulab, 7th
Mule Corps, att’d MSG.
Died of Wounds No.2445 Sepoy Teja Singh; No.2688 Bugler Jewa Singh.
One other Sepoy from the 126th Baluchis was
killed on the Hatum battlefield that day. (9) In total the Combined Field Ambulance
evacuated nine British and forty-five Indian casualties.
Awards for the Hatum action granted
to the Malay States Guides
Military
Cross (10) Captain Philip Thomas Blanford, 84th Punjabis,
att’d Malay States Guides
Indian
Order of Merit, 2nd Class (11) 2639 Havildar Kehar Singh
1631 Naik Sawan Singh
2519 Sepoy Sarwan Singh
“For conspicuous gallantry in dashing out to
within 400 yards of the enemy’s position and bringing in a wounded Indian
officer under heavy shell and rifle fire.”
Mentioned
in Despatches
Major (Temporary Lt Colonel) C.H.B. Lees, CMG,
53rd Sikhs att’d Malay States Guides
Captain P.T. Blanford, MC, 84th Punjabis,
att’d Malay States Guides,
2639 Havildar Kehar Singh, IOM
1631 Naik
Sawan Singh, IOM
1632 Naik Santa Singh, IDSM
2519 Sepoy
Sarwan Singh, IOM
Operations in Aden until the war ended
The Malay States Guides remained in Aden until 1919 and the
operations in which they were involved were very similar to the Hatum action. Moveable
and Flying Columns went out into the desert to confront the Turks, British
posts were defended against Turkish raiders and
Turkish posts were raided by the
Guides. The following citations give an
idea of the tactics employed:
Military Cross (12) Captain Guy
Fisher Turner, 82nd Punjabis att’d Malay States Guides
“For
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He led a party of has regiment
across difficult country against an enemy picquet five miles away. His party
rushed and surprised the picquet and killed several of the enemy. He showed
great skill and initiative.”
Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class (13) Jemadar
Gurditt Singh
“On the
night of the 15th-16th February 1918 this Indian officer commanded a platoon in
an enterprise against an enemy picquet.
He personally volunteered to go forward and exactly locate the picquet
and by doing so materially assisted the success of the operation. Subsequently in the attacks, he led his
platoon with great gallantry and determination.”
Indian Distinguished Service Medal GGO 887, 5 Aug 1916
Jemadar Bogh Singh, Infantry 1632 Naik Santa Singh, Infantry
GGO 89, 11 Jan 1919
1563 Sepoy Lal Sing, Infantry GGO 585, March 1919
1067 Havildar Wir Singh, Artillery
GGO 2912, 20 Sep 1919
864 Havildar Bagga Singh, Infy
2592 Gunner Abdul Rahim, Artillery
2736 Gunner Roshan Din, Arty
2654 Sepoy Surain
Singh, Infantry
Indian
Meritorious Service Medal
Artillery
Battery
QM Sgt Chand Singh
1442 Driver
Naik Ghulam Din
Companion of the Most Distinguished Order
of St Michael and St George (CMG)
Maj.
(Temp Lt Col.) Charles Henry Brownlow Lees, 53rd Sikhs att’d Malay States
Guides (14) Croix de Guerre
(French)
Lieutenant-Colonel C.H.B. Lees (15) Medaille Militaire (French)
2639
Havildar Kehar Singh, IOM (16) Medaille d’Honneur
avec Glaives (en Vermeil) (French)
Subadar
Thaman Singh (17)
Right: IDSM to Havildar Bagga Singh, Malay States Guides for Aden
Order of British India
Subadar
Sohan Singh, Artillery (18)
Brevet rank of
Major Captain
P.T. Blanford, 84th Punjabis, att’d Malay States Guides
Mentioned
in Despatches
Maj. (Temp. Lt-Col.)
C.H.B. Lees, CMG, 53rd Sikhs Frontier Force
Lieut. (Actg Capt.)
R.C. Eastmond, Indian Army Reserve of Officers (IARO)
Artillery
Subadar Sohan Singh
Jemadar Karim Baksh 2592 Gunner Abdul Rahim 2736 Gunner Roshan Din
On the 2nd August 1917 Major Cyprian Edward
Borton, 126th Baluchis attached to the Malay States Guides, was killed in
action in another engagement near Hatum. (19) He is buried in Maala
Cemetery, Aden, Yemen
along with Captain Leslie. Major Borton,
Captain Leslie and
Lieutenant Maclean are commemorated on a brass plaque installed by their
brother officers in All-Saints Church, Taiping,
Malaysia.
On the
Heliopolis (Aden) Memorial in Egypt are inscribed the names of thirty-five men
of the Malay States Guides who died in Aden, while another name is inscribed on
the Heliopolis (Port Tewfik) Memorial. Names can also be seen on Great War memorials
in Malaysia.
The
Regimental Colours were retained in All-Saints Church Taiping but were lost, as
was the regimental silver, during the Japanese occupation of Malaya
in World War II.
The end of the Malay States Guides
By the end
of the Great War the strength of the regiment was around 500 men, a big
reduction from the established strength of over 900 that had been in service
when war was declared. Fighting and
harsh climatic conditions had led to many casualty and medical evacuations from
Aden; the three
years of war in that theatre had taken a heavy toll. Most men wished to return to the Punjab and the pleasures of family life. After
consultations and discussions, and ever-mindful of how he had been let down
early in the war by the refusal to serve overseas, Colonel Lees recommended the
disbandment of the regiment. The Rulers
of the Federated Malay States were advised to
accept this decision, and a Burmese battalion of the Indian Army was allocated
to provide security in the States.
The Indian
officers and men were given three options: to serve in the Federated Malay
States Police or the Indian Army, with previous military service counted for
both options, or to become redundant on generous terms. It appears that 200 men opted for the
Federated Malay States Police and judt one man opted for the Indian Army; the
remainder accepted redundancy and returned to the Punjab. The redundant men who later trickled back to
Malaya when they had spent all their Aden
savings and redundancy settlements could join the police, but without previous
military service counting for seniority and pension.
Thus the
brief but interesting life of the Malay States Guides ended in 1919. The regiment was what it was – a colourful
addition to the entourage of its owners, the Sultans of the Federated
Malay States. In peacetime
the British military authorities inspected the regiment but could not direct
it, as it was not theirs to direct. The
British officers seconded to the regiment in the pre-war years failed to
prepare their men both mentally and contractually for an overseas war, and lack
of strong internal discipline led to slackness, intrigue and profiteering within the unit and finally
to a clash of cultures after mobilisation that would never be forgiven by the
British authorities.
But when the criticism and carping is over, the fact that stands out is
that the Malay States Guides went to serve for over three years in one of the
most physically demanding and under-resourced operational theatres of the Great
War – and the regiment served and fought well.
Shabash to
the Indian officers and men - Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammadans and Pathans – brothers
in arms who served in Aden fighting for both their Malay Sultans and the
British Empire!
Sources
Inder Singh, History
of Malay States Guides (1873-19190 (Cathay Printers, Penang 1965); Rana
Chhina. The Indian Distinguished Service
Medal (Invicta, New Delhi 2001);
Peter Duckers, Reward of Valour. The
Indian Order of Merit, 1914-1918 (Jade Publishing, Oldham 1999); Sir
Charles Lucas (editor), The Empire at War
(Oxford University Press 1926); Barry Renfrew, Forgotten Regiments. Regular and Volunteer Units of the British Far
East (Terrier Press, Amersham 2009); Honours
& Awards, Indian Army Aug. 1914 – Aug. 1921 (published officially in 1931 as Roll of Honour Indian Army 1914-1921, reprinted by J.B. Hayward
& Son); Lieutenant-Colonel E.R.B. Murray, Commandant, Report of the Malay States Guides For The Year 1913, Supplement to
the Federated Malay States Government Gazette, 27th March 1914 (on-line at <http://commonrepo.um.edu.my/29/1/FMS%20GOV%201914_8.pdf>);
London Gazette , despatches
and awards notifications; Medal Index Cards; Army Lists, 1915 and 1916; War
Diaries (The National Archives, Kew, London – found within file ref. WO95 5438)
of the Malay States Guides Infantry & Artillery Battery, Aden Combined
Field Ambulance, 18th Mule Corps, Aden Troop, 15-pdr Camel Battery RGA, 10-pdr
Camel Battery RGA, 5-inch BL Battery Aden, Comdr. Royal Arty Aden, Comdr Royal
Engineers Aden.
(This article
appeared in a recent edition of DURBAR, the journal of the Indian Military
History Society: http://imhs.org.uk/ )
(1) From the poem “For to
Admire” by Rudyard Kipling. (2) India Office
Records, Military Collections, shelf mark
L/Mil/7/5381: telegraphic correspondence
between the Viceroy in India and the War
Office in London
from 22 June to 7 July 1916. (3) Lieut. Moira Francis Allan
Maclean, Royal Garrison Artillery (4) Single companies were identified
alphabetically whereas double-companies were numbered. (5) Although not recorded in the diary, from 14 Nov
1911 Capt. G.F. Turner was employed
with the Guides. He served with them in Aden and was awarded
the Military Cross (6) 2nd Lieut. Leonard Clive Pearson was a
Perak planter in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers. (7) One British estimate of Turkish casualties
was around 200, but this figure was not proven. (8) His body was recovered and is buried in Maala Cemetery,
Aden. (9) No. 4736 Sepoy Khanun Khan. (10) London
Gazette, 26 Jun 1916 (citation not published).
(11) Gazette
of India,
GGO 886, 5 Aug 1916 (12) London Gazette, 13 May 1918 (13) Gazette of India, GGO 2912, 20 Sep 1919 (14) London Gazette, 17 Oct 1917. Major Lees, a regular
officer of the 53rd Sikhs, was posted to
the Malay States Guides in March 1914, serving as
2-i-c in the temporary rank of
Lt-Colonel. He continued serving with the Guides until January
1921, even though w.e.f. 1st February
1918 he was appointed to the command of the 53rd Sikhs in the
permanent rank of Lt-Colonel. (15) London Gazette, 6 Nov 1918 (16) London Gazette,
6 Nov 1918; Gazette of India, GGO
208/1919 (17) London Gazette, 15 Dec 1919 (18) Recorded in Honours
& Awards Indian Army 1914-1921 (p.26). A supernumerary award
for field service in Aden, it has not
been traced elsewhere and the ‘class’ of award is
not known. (19) After the death of Major Borton, the
appointment of 2nd-in-Command was held by Captain T.B. Minniken, 6th Punjabis
att’d Malay States Guides.
However the presence of the 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H.V. Cox, CB, CSI, aboard a
naval convoy on its way to Egypt,
allowed offensive action to be taken by the British on 10th November 1914, and
the Turkish post at Sheikh Saad was attacked.
The landing party, well supported by the Royal Navy, drove off the
Turkish defenders, captured six guns and other important equipment and
destroyed the enemy entrenchments, wells and magazines before re-embarking for
Egypt and then Gallipoli, minus the 23rd Sikh Pioneers who now strengthened the
Aden garrison.
The
18th Mule Corps deployed all its animals to provide transport support for the
operation and the 56th Camel Corps provided camels. The Ammunition and Supply
Columns were ordered to base themselves at Sheikh Othman and to send forward requested
supplies from there. To prevent noisy activity from compromising the operation
detailed instructions were issued to units on such subjects as pre-breaking the
seals on ammunition containers and oiling their retaining clips. Visual signalling was to be used on the
operation with Dar Al Amir being the central Visual Signalling Station, but the
HQ Cable Section was to lay cable for the column commander to maintain
telephone communications with Aden. The route was to be picqueted as far as Robat
by the Sheikh Othman garrison; after Robat picqeting duties were the responsibility
of the Moveable Column commander, Brigadier-General W.C. Walton.
Above: Hatum Ridge
Right: IDSM to Havildar Bagga Singh, Malay States Guides for Aden