Japanese Attack on Sarawak in December 1941and the
fighting
withdrawal of 2/15th Punjab Regiment
“…a feat of endurance
which assuredly will rank high in the annals of warfare… It says much for the
morale of this fine battalion that it remained a formed and disciplined body
till the end." (1)
British-protected Borneo in 1939
Borneo, the third largest island in the
world, lies to the east of Malaysia
and between the Philippines,
Sumatra and Java. In 1939 most of Borneo was Dutch colonial
territory, (2) but the strip running along the northwest coast up to the northern tip was
protected by Britain. North Borneo
was administered by the chartered British North Borneo Company. Lying off the southwestern tip of the
Company’s territory was the Crown Colony of Labuan Island, (3)
and southwest of North Borneo on the coast was
the independent State of Brunei. Sarawak occupied most of the remainder of the northwest
coastline. It was a state owned privately by the Brooke family who had been
gifted the land by the Sultan of Brunei. The Brookes ruled their territory from
Kuching. (4) Britain
had treaty obligations to protect British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.
In 1939 Borneo
was undeveloped, but it was abundant in timber and agricultural and mineral
resources, especially rubber and oil. Britain exploited oilfields at Serai in Brunei and at Miri in Sarawak,
and pumped the oil to a refinery at Lutong on the coast; from the refinery
loading-lines ran out to deep-water points where tankers could load. Although British-protected Borneo had
strategic importance in that it commanded the eastern approaches to Singapore and Malaya,
there were no British garrisonsthere and each territory provided its own small
police forces.
As World War II progressed Japan, albeit still neutral, flexed its muscles
and developed strategic plans to seize the whole of Borneo
as part of the Japanese-designed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The prize was Borneo’s
oil which was also being exploited by the Dutch on the east side of the island.
It was a vital commodity that Japan
desperately needed. With this in mind, the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo determined that Borneo, together with the rest of
the Netherlands East Indies, would be seized after simultaneous attacks had
been launched on Malaya and the Philippines.
Above:The island of Borneo,
British territory
edged in red and Dutch
territory edged in
yellow.
Sarfor
The defence plan for British Borneo, which had
been devised in Singapore,
was not afforded a high priority in terms of resources. Initially an infantry brigade was laid down
as the minimum requirement for a successful defence, but finally this formation
was reduced to one battalion with a few supporting engineers and artillerymen. It was decided not to defend North Borneo but
to prepare a static defence around Kuching and its airfield in southwestern Sarawak. The Brunei and Miri
oilfields were to be demolished before an enemy landing could
seize them intact. Although Labuan Island
was an important cable and wireless station, no attempt was made to defend it.
The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Punjab
Regiment was selected to be the principal unit in Sarawak Force which was
referred to as Sarfor. Besides the Punjabis, and the sappers and
gunners Sarfor would contain the
four Sarawak state forces:
·
The Sarawak Coastal Marine Service
·
The Sarawak Rangers
·
The Sarawak Armed Police
·
The Sarawak Volunteer Force
It was envisaged that Brunei, as part
of Sarfor, would produce a unit of
Volunteers. SARFOR was not allocated any
dedicated air or naval units. Liaison
with the Dutch forces across the land border was made but without much
commitment from Singapore,
despite the Dutch possessing military aeroplanes and vessels as well as ground
forces.
Above: Officers of the 2.15th
Punjab Regiment prior to the outbreak of war
Sarfor
prepares for a Japanese attack
The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Punjab
Regiment was a ‘class company’ battalion with one company each of Sikhs (‘A’
Company), Punjabi Musalmans (‘B’ Company), Khattacks (‘C’ Company) and Jats
(‘D’ Company). The Battalion had come
from Poona to Singapore as part of 6th Indian
Infantry Brigade. In Singapore the Battalion worked on defence duties
and counter-invasion measures until December 1940 when one company was tasked
to go to Sarawak. ‘C’ Company, commanded by Major C.A.L. Davis
was selected, and Davis with 2nd Lieutenant J.E.S. Temple
and 98 men sailed to Miri whilst Lieutenant J.H.C. Brown and 52 men went to
Kuching.
‘C’ Company was referred to as Pundet, an abbreviation of Punjab
Detachment, and its mission was to provide security for demolition parties that
would be provided by the Sarawak Oil Company; later the mission was broadened
to include the training of local forces.
In March 1941 a two-gun detachment of 6-inch coastal artillery arrived
at Lutong, manned by the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery and commanded by
Captain H.N.P.R. Halstead. Pundet also received seven medium
machine guns, one anti-tank rifle, two trucks and several rifles for use by
Volunteers. Major Davis was based in
Lutong and in his office was the control switch that would demolish the
loading-lines. Six sappers from 34th
Fortress Company, Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant W.St.P.M. ‘Tubby’ Hancock,
and a platoon of 24 men of The Loyal Regiment (North
Lancashire) under Lieutenant G.G. Withers, all trained in
demolition work, arrived at Lutong in July to work alongside the Sarawak Oil
Company Staff.
Major Davis and Lieutenant Brown commenced
training the Sarawak Volunteers at Lutong and Kuching. The government of Sarawak
was not keen that the Volunteers should fight any invaders, but it reasoned
that if the Volunteers confined themselves to being involved in demolition
duties then reprisals could be avoided.
The oil workers themselves had requested that they be uniformed so as
not to be treated as saboteurs by an enemy, and this request had triggered the
formation of the Volunteers.
Above:
The Astana, Rajah
Brook’s old palace, on
the north bank of the Sarawak at Kuching
In May 1941 Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane MC
brought the remainder of the Punjabis to Kuching and intensive reconnaissance
of the Kuching area commenced; Colonel
Lane being appointed Officer Commanding Troops
Sarawak and Brunei. The training of the Sarawak State Forces was
speeded up and Punjabi gun detachments were trained to man three elderly
18-pounder guns that were issued to the Battalion. As the Battalion had first-line and
second-line reinforcements with it, plus an attached platoon of Jats from the
4/15th Punjabis, the Battalion strength was 1,075 all ranks. When the state forces of Sarawak and Brunei were
added Sarfor numbered 2,565 all
ranks. In December ‘G’ Detachment of 19
Indian General Hospital under Major J.E. ‘Jimmy’
O’Donnell, Indian Medical Service (IMS), was sent to join the Battalion. Two other IMS officers, Captains M. Sharma
and S.H. Ahmed, assisted Major O’Donnell.
In view of the Borneo
terrain of thick jungle, very few roads and many rivers, Colonel Lane appreciated that a static
defence would not last long against a determined enemy prepared to march
through jungle or to seize boats on rivers in order to outflank a defensive
position. He therefore proposed the
concept of mobile defence whereby after demolishing the oilfields, invaders would
be harassed and Kuching airfield would be held until enemy pressure determined
that the airfield and its Royal Air Force (RAF) direction-finding equipment should
also be demolished. Sarfor would then operate in small
sub-units from jungle bases where supplies had been cached, using guerrilla
warfare tactics to deny the enemy freedom of movement along the roads, tracks
and rivers and on the airfield. In June
Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East,
visited Kuching and endorsed Colonel
Lane’s proposal which was termed Plan ‘A’.
Brooke-Popham’s endorsement was a
significant step forward for Colonel
Lane, as since his arrival he had been frustrated
by Singapore’s different
view of the situation in Sarawak. This had occurred because two staff officers
from Singapore had earlier briefly visited Kuching and reported misleading
statements such as ‘the jungle and coastal swamps were impenetrable’ and that
‘the airfield could be defended by a couple of platoons’. Sadly this erroneous reporting stuck in the
minds of other staff officers in Singapore who denied Sarfor resources such as finance and
weapons and uniforms for Volunteers.
Colonel Lane had to go to Singapore personally to rectify some of these
problems, whilst in the meantime the Sarawak government and the oil companies
provided, free of charge, resources such as vehicles and fuel. In September Rajah Brooke went to Australia at a time when his leadership was
really needed in Sarawak by his government and
his people. He did not return before the Japanese invaded, much to the
disapproval of the Punjabis who were in the meantime working harmoniously with
the local population.
Prior to Colonel Lane’s arrival there had been no
dedicated counter-intelligence activity by the Sarawak
police. This was unfortunate as several
Japanese civilians were established in Sarawak
managing agricultural estates or working professionally in jobs such as
dentistry. Colonel Lane established an
internal security police section but little could be done about the Japanese
civilians until war was declared. During the invasion several groups of
Japanese wore Sarawak police uniforms, which
indicated the prior planning and military efficiency of at least some of the
estate managers and dentists.
Meanwhile more resources had trickled into
Kuching, perhaps the most useful being an Intelligence Officer, Captain D.H.
James MC, who had lived in Japan
for many years, speaking the language and understanding the military
culture. Other arrivals were a Royal
Engineers advisor, Lieutenant ‘Teddy’ Marston; an adjutant for the Sarawak
Rangers, Captain Bruce, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders; and three
Permanent Staff Instructors for the Sarawak Volunteers in Kuching and Miri and
for the Brunei Volunteers in Seria. Captain
James pulled no punches when describing the very professional military
abilities of the Japanese, but as this was not in line with the dismissive
British propaganda being disseminated from Singapore
about Japanese military inadequacies, James was soon recalled from Borneo. (5) Captain B.W. Cahusac (6)
of the Intelligence Corps became the Sarfor
Intelligence Officer.
The General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command,
General A.E. Percival, visited Kuching in late November for two days and talked
with government officials and Sarfor. He then rejected Colonel Lane’s mobile defence plan. The close static defence of Kuching airfield
was re-ordered, without any depth in the defences being allowed. This became known as Plan ‘B’. All that mattered was that the Kuching
airfield be kept open for as long as possible for the potential use of Allied
fighter aircraft. This demoralising
decision meant that the jungle caches of supplies had to be recovered and
returned to Kuching and the Punjabis’
mobile guerrilla mission
was cancelled. General Percival had
sounded the Last Post for the 2/15th Punjabis.
War and the action at the oilfields
When war with Japan was declared on 8th December
1941, 2/15th Punjabis was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel G. Ross-Thompson,
Colonel Lane being the Commander of Sarfor. Major F.G. Milligan was the Sarfor staff officer, and Captain J.E.S. Temple
was the Battalion Adjutant. Captain
Mohd. Mataul Mulk, brother of the Prince of Chitral, (7) was Liaison Officer to the local state forces.
The Battalion contained fourteen or fifteen British officers, about half
of them being attached from the Sarawak State Forces, and twenty Indian officers.
By now, unfortunately, the Brunei Volunteers
and the Sarawak Volunteers at Miri were fading away due to reluctance by their
employers to let them be used in any capacity outside of the oilfields. However the Volunteers in Kuching thrived
energetically, and the Sarawak Coastal Marine Service was trained in river and
estuary reconnaissance and coast-watching.
The Sarawak Rangers, many of them from headhunting tribes, had been
trained in guerrilla warfare, and the Sarawak Armed Police were effective. But the Sarawak
government by now realised that Sarfor
could not stop a Japanese invasion, and it was not happy about any of its
people offering open resistance to an invader.
The absence of the Ruler, Rajah Brooke, did not help matters, and it
could well have been that this government reluctance influenced General
Percival’s decision to cancel the guerrilla warfare aspect of the defence plan.
At Miri, Major A.W.D. Slatter’s ‘B’ Company
had replaced ‘C’ Company, Major Davis having been recalled to India. (8) In Seria, Miri and Lutong the demolition
teams had been working to a partial denial programme for several months; the
Miri field had been closed down and the Seria wells had been sealed with
cement. On 8th December, along with the
news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, came the order from Singapore to
complete the Miri and Seria demolitions; these were achieved in good order and
‘B’ Company, the sappers, the Loyals’ demolition platoon and the gunners with
one 6-inch coastal gun concentrated at Miri, the other gun having been dumped
in a river that it could not be got across.
On 13th December three British ships arrived at Miri and embarked all
military personnel and oilfield technicians there, plus important pieces of
technical equipment from the oil fields that were destined to be stored in Singapore.
During the next day a Japanese bomber attacked
the small convoy and whilst not materially damaging the ships it engaged an
anti-aircraft Bren gun crew on Major Slatter’s ship, HMS Lipis. Major Slatter was
manning the gun and returned fire but he and three of his Punjabis were killed
during the action, whilst eighteen more men were wounded, including Sapper V.
Green and one of the Loyals. The convoy
then reached Kuching without further incident and disembarked ‘B’ Company
before moving on to Singapore
with the Loyals platoon and the gunners.
The ‘scorched earth’ demolition operations at Miri and Seria had
been concluded successfully
and when a Japanese naval force arrived on 16th December it found that both
oilfields and the refinery were unusable.
Kuching
The war arrived at Kuching on 19th December
when sixteen Japanese bombers raided the town and the airfield, killing 25
civilians and wounding around 80 others whilst setting a petrol dump alight and
causing other damage. Allied aircraft
did not intervene. Four days later a
Japanese naval convoy arrived off the coast, and Singapore ordered the immediate
destruction of Kuching airfield. The sappers destroyed the airstrip and the
direction finding equipment that night, using 50 boreholes that had been
drilled across the strip in preparation.
Above:
Major Japanese invasion routes
Map byGraham
Donaldson and Previously on the "The Dutch East
Indies Campaign 1941-1942"
A Japanese force had sailed
from Camranh Bay in French Indo-China (9) and consisted of the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and 124th
Infantry Regiment augmented by the Yokosuka
2nd Special Naval Landing Force. The
Japanese first landed at Miri and left one battalion to occupy North Borneo,
Brunei and Labuan
Island before sailing to
Kuching. Japanese aircraft supplied
vital support to the force by bombing the Dutch Singkawang II airfield that lay
west of Kuching. The bombing of the
runway prevented Dutch planes from taking off to attack the Japanese ships, and
later that day the Dutch were authorised to remove their planes to Palembang in Sumatra. However two Dutch submarines engaged the
enemy ships, sinking two and damaging two others; a Japanese submarine then
stalked one of its
Dutch adversaries and sank it. Five British Blenheim aircraft from Singapore,
operating at almost the limit of their range, attacked the Japanese ships but
did little damage.
The following morning, 24th December, twenty
enemy landing craft approached the mouths of the Santubong and Muara Tebas rivers
that led to Kuching. First to engage the
Japanese were the Sarawak Coastal Marine Service and the Sarawak Rangers, firing
from the swamps. A Punjab Regiment
gunboat platoon, firing anti-tank rifles from its small craft, went into action
for two hours but then moved up-river when it was out-gunned. As the landing craft approached Kuching the
Punjabis’ 18-pounder guns started scoring hits, supported by a 3-inch mortar
detachment. Seven craft were sunk before
the Japanese landed and overran the gun and mortar positions, seizing one gun
before it could be withdrawn. Colonel
Lane had been given Percival’s permission to withdraw after holding up the
invasion for as long as possible, and fighting between Captain P.Y. Fairburn’s
Sikh ‘A’ Company (10) and the invaders continued
until 16.30 hours when Kuching was in Japanese hands. To save the civilian population Kuching had
been declared an ‘open city’ and there were no British defence activities
within the town. ‘A’ Company then
withdrew to join the Battalion at the airfield. On the way a platoon of ‘A’
Company under 2nd Lieutenant J.H. Farwell, having already been dive-bombed, was
badly ambushed at the Kuching suspension bridge by an enemy group wearing
Sarawak Constabulary uniforms. Those of the platoon not killed were captured
including John Farwell. The Japanese
wasted no time in deploying and by nightfall they were testing the airfield
perimeter defences; these probes continued throughout the night.
Next day, Christmas morning, after
unsuccessfully requesting orders from Singapore
Colonel Lane ordered a withdrawal into Dutch
Borneo. A group of British women and
children along with the hospital detachment were sent ahead during a lull in
the firing, and ‘A’ Company went to secure the vital ferry crossing at Batu
Kitak. As these movements were
proceeding a large Japanese force attacked the 2/15th Punjabis rear-guard in
strength. After a stiff fight, particularly
by the Khattacks who machine-gunned a considerable number of advancing
Japanese, four British officers, six Indian officers and 230 sepoys were killed
or taken prisoner, wounded prisoners being bayoneted by the Japanese. Captain J.H.C. ‘Bruno’ Brown, OC ‘B’ Company,
was amongst the dead having killed two Japanese with his revolver before a
third bayoneted him. Lieutenant D.A.
‘Doggy’ Hodges, OC ‘C’ Company, was amongst the prisoners, having surrendered
his company when it was surrounded and only two platoons were still able to
fight. Only a few sepoys trickled back
to re-join the Battalion. The Japanese
casualty list for this rear-guard action was believed to have included 374 men
killed, including the formation commander.
At the Batu Kitak ferry
confusion reigned when firing broke out nearby. The terrified ferrymen ran away
after only a few crossings, leaving the ferry on the far bank, and attempts to
put the ferry back into use failed.
Mortars and machine guns were then dumped in the river whilst a few dugout
canoes were used to move the sepoys across, each man carrying a large
ammunition load. A new rear-guard was
formed of two platoons of Jats under Captain P.J.W.
Crosland from ‘D’ Company, accompanied by
the two remaining 18-pounder guns and Captain M.W. Chapman’s Carrier Platoon.
Chapman was in overall command of this rear-guard which faced the enemy from
the Kuching bank of the river until just before dawn. Chapman then disabled and
abandoned the guns and the carriers and forcefully persuaded local boatmen to
take his men across the river. Five days
later and after a 100-kilometre march the rear-guard joined the 2/15th Punjabis
at Sanggau in Dutch Borneo.
Colonel Lane, who next morning found that
his black hair had turned white overnight, kept his weary men moving on foot to
the Dutch border near Krokong. Here the
local Sarawak units were disbanded as their
military commitment did not extend beyond the state borders. However several Volunteer and Ranger officers
and senior ranks chose to fight on with the Battalion, as did two Rangers, a
Sea Dyak named Lancelot and a Malay named Suhail Ali. All these men from Sarawak who stayed and
fought with the Punjabis were extremely useful because of their intimate
knowledge of Borneo; sadly fate was not
destined to be kind to many of them. The
wounded, sick and women and children were sent on to Sanggau near the Dutch
airbase Singkawan II, escorted by those Volunteers who chose to fight. The strength of Sarfor was now seventeen British officers, fourteen Indian
officers and 790 men. These numbers
included the Royal Engineers, Indian Medical Service and RAF personnel who had
been attached to the Battalion in Kuching, plus the remaining local state
personnel.
[1] Lieutenant - General Arthur Ernest Percival CB DSO OBE MC OStJ DL
[2] The Dutch (now Indonesian) part of Borneo
is known as Kalimantan.
[3]Modern Malaysia consists of thirteen
states and three ‘federal territories.’ Labuan
is one of the latter. .
[4] After World War II Britain
took over the administration of North Borneo and Sarawak, and they are now
states of Malaysia.
Together with Labuan, they are known collectively as ‘East Malaysia’ as opposed
to the eleven states and two federal territories of ‘Mainland Malaysia.’
[5] Captain James was later taken prisoner in Malaya.
[6] Basil Cahusac was last seen by Punjabi
personnel when the Kempetai (Japanese Security Police) removed him from a
prison cell in Balikpapan Jail, Borneo. He is buried in Jakarta War
Cemetery.
[7] Prior to WW2, Lieut. Burhan-ud-Din, son of the Mehtar
or ruler of Chitral, was serving with the 5/10 Baluch Regiment. At the
commencement of hostilities he was one of a number pf Indian officers sent for
flying training. He served for a short time as a pilot with No.1 Sqn RIAF in
the NWF Province. His aptitudes proved to be
unsuited to flying and he was returned to the Baluch Regt with whom he was
captured in Singapore.
He opted to join the INA and became a leading figure before surrendering in Rangoon to elements of
the advancing 14th Army. [8] Major Davis was detained in Singapore and went into captivity. [9] Now Vietnam. [10] ‘A’ Company had been tasked with delaying
the invasion along the coast whilst the remainder of the Punjabis concentrated
to hold the airfield.