and the Special Service Detachments (Commando) in Burma in 1942

Come you back to Mandalay,
Where the old Flotilla lay:
Can't you 'ear their paddles chunkin' from Rangoon to Mandalay?
On the road to Mandalay,
Where the flyin'-fishes play, An' the dawn comes up like thunder outer China 'crost the Bay!

(Rudyard Kipling)

The Bush Warfare School, Maymyo, Burma

In October 1941 a Royal Engineers officer, Major Michael Calvert, was posted from a Training Centre in Australia where he had been preparing Australian and New Zealand soldiers for Commando missions in the Pacific.  Calvert’s new posting was to be Chief Instructor at the Bush Warfare School in Maymyo (now named Pyin Oo Lwin), a pleasant hill station north-east of Mandalay in Burma (now Myanmar). 

On arrival Calvert found that the role of the Bush Warfare School was to covertly train suitable troops for British Mission 204 to China, and that the Mission’s role was to provide 15 squads of guerrilla warfare instructors for attachment to Chinese military units who would fight the invading Japanese.  The British would not be in command and would act only as instructors and advisors.  Many British troops were sent to the school from the Middle East where they had been serving operationally in Layforce, a Middle East Commando formation, and Mission 101, a British-sponsored guerrilla force that had fought the Italians in Abyssinia.  Other troops came from Hong Kong, Malaya and Australia.  Calvert had served in China and unlike many other British officers he respected the abilities of the Japanese forces.


Japanese aggression

Japanese troops had been operating in Manchuria since 1931 and had been fighting in mainland China since 1937; in December 1941 Japan attacked the USA at Pearl Harbour, following this up with invasions of the Philippines, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaya and Burma.  This aggression radically changed the role of the Bush Warfare School as many trainees were formed into Special Service Detachments (SSDs) Nos. 1, 2 and 3, all with the title ‘(Commando)’.  The Order of Battle of the British Army in Burma dated 1st April 1942 locates the SSDs as No. 1 being in Corps Troops, No. 2 in 1 Burma Division and No. 3 in 17 Indian Division (1).

Colonel Orde Wingate, the former Commander of Mission 101 (also known as Gideon Force) was placed in charge of the SSDs with the intention of carrying out Long Range Penetration operations behind the Japanese front lines.  Wingate, although a tactical visionary and an inspirer of troops, was never an easy man to get on with but he and Calvert found that they had much in common; this association was to last until Wingate’s death in 1944 in the second Chindit operation.

However the chance to mount Long Range Penetration missions during 1942 never materialised, nor could the British and their American allies then provide the air resources to sustain such operations.  Also whilst the Burmese Christian and Animist hill tribes generally supported Britain for the protection she provided against lowland Buddhist Burman aggression, the Burmans did not want Britain in their country, and they especially did not want the large number of Indians who had migrated to Burma under British rule.  As will be seen Burman collaboration with the Japanese would have made long range penetration an extremely difficult task.  Before the war commenced the Japanese had taken advantage of this anti-British sentiment and Burman nationalist officers had been covertly trained on Japanese territory; this led to the rapid formation of the Burma National Army (2) which operated alongside Japanese troops during the 1942 British retreat from Burma. 

In the end Wingate flew back to India to promote his vision for future Chindit operations, leaving two SSDs operating in the east of Burma where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Sheck’s Chinese Nationalist troops were entering in an attempt to block Japanese advances northwards.  These two SSDs, lightly armed and equipped, carried out minor operations and demolitions and then either withdrew into China or made a long, arduous and hazardous march north towards the Myitkyina and Fort Hertz areas in northern Burma, from where the survivors crossed into Assam.  The other SSD under Calvert operated on the Irrawaddy River, withdrawing with the main British forces up the Chindwin River into the Indian Princely State of Manipur.

Meanwhile the role of Mission 204 was not neglected as three dedicated Commando contingents from the Bush Warfare School crossed into China to support the Chinese, and their frustrations and tribulations will be briefly summarised later.  The only records of serious fighting performed by the former students of the Bush Warfare School are those of Calvert’s SSD No. 3, and those actions are now described.

The raid on Henzada

In March 1942, before he had met Orde Wingate, Calvert requested a tasking for his SSD from the Headquarters of 17 Division near Prome, and he was told rather vaguely by a harassed staff officer to ‘look after the west bank of the Irrawaddy River’.  Feeling rather pleased with the scope that this offered his pleasure increased when he came across Captain Duncan Johnston, Royal Marines.  Johnston commanded Force Viper, a unit that totalled 106 Royal Marines and a Surgeon Lieutenant, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.  Force Viper had come from Ceylo, (3), now Sri Lanka, and possessed its own small craft, a Vickers machine gun, 13 Bren guns, 24 Tommy guns, four 2-inch mortars, and rifles.  On arrival in Burma Force Viper’s initial task had been to patrol the Gulf of Martaban between Rangoon and Moulmein to prevent Japanese sea-borne infiltration, but now due to the enemy advance north from Rangoon the Marines were operating on the Irrawaddy and they had arranged the use of a civilian river steamer named Hastings to complement their four government motor launches and three motor boats.


Left: A Prewar Photo of Orde Wingate


The former Bush Warfare School trainees all wore Australian-style slouch hats, and as it was rumoured that an Australian division might appear in Burma Calvert decided on a deception plan to suggest to the enemy and their local sympathisers that the Australians were already in the country.  Concurrently demolition teams would destroy targets such as railway bridges, oil installations and boats that could be useful to the Japanese; these teams would be transported to and from the river banks by Force Viper’s motor launch Rita.  The overall aim of this mission was to slow down the enemy advance up the west bank of the Irrawaddy.  The Captain of the Hastings, William Rea, a reserve officer who had served on minesweepers in the Great War, agreed to risk his steamer and civilian crew on the operation. 

The town of Henzada, 60 miles downstream from Prome, was chosen as the main target for the raid which took place on 17th March.  The journey downstream was uneventful and suitable targets were demolished, but trouble began when Calvert landed his men at Henzada and began telling the townsfolk, through a local crew member of the Hastings who acted as an interpreter, that the Australian Army had arrived in Burma.  Behind the civilian crowd a unit of the Burma National Army supported by Japanese soldiers prepared itself to capture the Marines and Commandos.

Eventually a voice from the crowd shouted in English “Lay down your arms. You are surrounded”.  It is believed that a corporal named Maddox shouted “Bollocks” in reply and the crowd dropped to the ground as a heavy firefight broke out between the British and Burman troops.  Calvert withdrew his men under fire to the riverbank where a support party had been positioned to provide covering fire; this fire was effective and it cut down many of the attackers who were running forward to kill the Commandos and Marines.  When Calvert had got all his party aboard the Hastings, which was moored to the river bank, it was discovered that some men were missing.  Calvert immediately took a party ashore, covered by fire from the Hasting’s upper deck, and retrieved his stragglers.

Captain Rea then had to turn his steamer around against the current and both Hastings and Rita exchanged heavy fire with the Burmans.  Fortunately on the upper deck of the Hastings sacks of food and other goods could be used to protect the Commandos and these sacks absorbed much of the enemy fire, however the crew of the Rita was less well protected and two Marines were wounded.  Total casualty figures for the Henzada raid vary according to the source consulted, but Calvert lost three men killed and up to seven wounded.  The enemy was believed to have lost over 100 men killed, but it is more than probable that several if not many of these were civilians caught in the cross fire.

The Captain of the Hastings was later awarded the Military Cross with the citation:  2nd Lieutenant (Acting Captain) William Rea, Army in Burma Reserve of Officers, Inland Waterways Transport, did excellent work as tugmaster at Rangoon in placing flats and barges.  This enabled the whole of the petrol, ammunition and military stores which had been loaded to be evacuated.  During the operations from Prome to Mingyang he volunteered to be a steamer captain and was employed continuously in the forward areas.  He consistently showed great gallantry and devotion to duty in the construction of booms across the river, the ferrying of troops under fire and enemy air action.  He also took part in operations with the Royal Marines.  It was due to his example of fearlessness that he was able to retain his civilian crew that was not trained for war.

On the return journey upriver Calvert reported the success of his mission by radio but he was ordered to report to HQ 17 Division immediately.  There he was verbally reprimanded for risking the steamer crew, the steamer itself which was the property of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, and for destroying oil installations that were the property of the Burmah Oil Company.  Feeling angry and dispirited Calvert strode away from the Headquarters but then he met Orde Wingate, and the course of Calvert’s war changed irrevocably.

Left: Orde Wingate showing the strain of war

The action at Padaung

The Commandos continued operating with Force Viper for a further two weeks, but in an action at Padaung on 30th March the British fell into an enemy trap.  Calvert was not involved in the operation and Johnston was in command, but once again the British were operating without adequate local intelligence.  A Japanese company had occupied riverside Padaung village before the Commandos and Marines arrived, and the villagers successfully concealed the Japanese in their houses.  After the villagers had prepared a succulent evening meal for the British, who then put sentries out and went to sleep, the Japanese emerged, surrounded the Commandos and Marines, and attacked them.  

The Royal Marines No. 3 Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Peter Cave, got the Vickers machine gun firing and stopped the enemy frontal assault, but other Japanese attacked from the rear, grenading and bayonetting the machine gun crew (4) to the ground.  The British were split into several small groups involved in desperate hand to hand fighting, using weapon butts, steel helmet rims and in one case a sword that was seized from a Japanese officer.  Johnston ordered his surviving men to withdraw to the launches.

But the Commander of No. 2 Platoon, a peace-time school teacher named Douglas Fayle, hid beneath a hut with two other Marines, and killed many unsuspecting Japanese.  He later was awarded a Military Cross with the terse citation:  Lieutenant Douglas Ronald Fayle, Royal Marines (Force Viper).  PADAUNG 30th March 1942.  Commander of the reserved platoon which was surprised at 0030 hours by a large force of Japanese.  He, with Corporal Winters, Royal Marines, and Marine Shaw, hid beneath a hut and inflicted casualties estimated at twenty-five to thirty at very close range on the enemy, using a tommy gun, a bren gun and grenades.  Was charged twice and ordered to surrender, but crept out at 0430, and made his escape with his party, having run out of ammunition.  Rejoined the launches six miles upstream at dawn.  

The same citation was used for the awards of the Military Medal to EX.2294 Marine (Acting Temporary Corporal) Harry Winters and to CH,X.2973 Marine Jack Shaw who had accompanied Douglas Fayle throughout the action (5).

But Padaung had been a bad defeat for the Marines and Commandos.  Around twenty men had been killed in the fight whilst others were captured or missing, including Peter Cave and his platoon.  At dawn the Japanese found a dozen wounded British troops and a day later used them for bayonet practice (6).


Calvert’s SSD during the withdrawal to India

 Calvert had been rejuvenated by his discussions with Orde Wingate, and also when he met the new British theatre commander Lieutenant General Sir Harold Alexander, who was pleased to find an officer who wanted to take the fight to the enemy.  Calvert was allowed to recruit more men for his SSD No. 3, and this he did by unorthodox but speedy methods, scouring the Provost Company, base hospitals, reinforcement camps and other rear echelon units; there was little time for effective training and whilst some of these new men proved to be good others were bad.

Whilst retreating up the Irrawaddy and Chindwin Rivers many British units lost cohesion with stragglers being left behind, whilst other men deserted to steal vehicles and to loot and rape; Calvert’s SSD was no exception.  But the SSD was involved in one planned operation when in early May it was detailed to cover the lower stretch of the dry Maukkdaw Chaung (river bed) on the south flank of the Ye-U – Shwegyin track that was being used for the British retreat.  The mission was to ambush any Japanese crossing the Chaung and to radio that information through to Brigade HQ.  This was an important task as just beyond Shwegyin lay Kalewa which had to be held until the last retreating unit passed through it, and Army HQ did not want Shwegyin to be outflanked from the west by the leading Japanese units.

The Commander of 48th Indian Infantry Brigade which had so far probably killed more Japanese than any other British formation in Burma considered that the Commando force needed strengthening and he allocated one company from 2/5th Gurkhas and another from the 7th Gurkhas composite battalion to the task.  Major Eric Stephen Holdaway MC commanded the 7th Gurkhas company and also the complete British party, probably much to Calvert’s chagrin; Captain M.C. Willis commanded the 5th Gurkhas company.  What exactly happened and what was said at the Maukkdaw Chaung has never been satisfactorily established, but three days later Japanese troops were observed crossing the Chaung.

Above: Crossing the Chindwin River at Shwegyin

It appears that Calvert wanted to immediately engage the enemy, but Holdaway did not as he had just received an order from Brigade HQ to withdraw, so a new position a tactical bound north of the Chaung was occupied for the next night.  Calvert still wanted action but Holdaway did not as he considered that his whole force was too exhausted to survive a serious encounter.  Brigade HQ was now on the move and not receiving radio messages, and Holdaway decided that it was more important to get a verbal message back to Brigade HQ than to risk losing the entire force.  Eric Holdaway was a brave man and had been awarded his Military Cross for fighting his company out of a Japanese encirclement on the Salween River in Lower Burma; he ordered a withdrawal to 48th Brigades’ last known location. 

By then three Japanese battalions were on the move in the area, all heading for Kalewa; Holdaway ordered everyone to leave the track they were on and to move through the jungle in small groups in an attempt to avoid the enemy.  In small parties the SSD quickly lost its unit identity, but once when halted by the Chindwin with a few men Calvert decided to bathe his dirty aching body; however a Japanese officer had made a similar decision and the two men fought each other bare-handed for several minutes in the water until Calvert drowned his opponent.  Calvert then sent his men to locate any adjacent Japanese, which they did, killing the soldiers who had been accompanying the enemy officer.

On another occasion Calvert with two other Commandos heard from villagers that Gurkhas were in a hut and he entered it to find it full of Japanese troops; the three Commandos turned round and sprinted into the jungle.  Calvert’s final adventure was when he and two men (7) who could hardly swim tried to cross the Chindwin which was 400 yards wide and swollen with Monsoon rain.  Calvert had to abandon the weapons and clothing bundle that he was pushing in order to assist his two companions to get across the river.  All three men survived the crossing and were sheltered by a group of Oriya (8) tribespeople from India who had been timber workers in Burma but who now were walking home (9).  The Oriyas insisted on the three Europeans wearing female Indian clothing as disguise, and it was thus attired that Calvert finally caught up with HQ 48th Brigade.  He then marched with the Brigade into Manipur to new employment with Wingate’s Chindits.

Of the other troops who had been at Maukkdaw Chaung Captain Willis did an excellent job in getting his company back to his battalion a fortnight later.  Only a handful of the 7th Gurkhas got back to their battalion and Eric Holdaway MC was not one of them; it is assumed that he was killed whilst fighting his way towards Kalewa.  Calvert and his biographer appear to be critical of Holdaway’s decisions at the Chaung, but the Gurkhas had been fighting Japanese before the SSDs had been formed, and they knew the score.  By not standing to fight at the Maukkyan Chaung Holdaway probably saved Calvert’s life.  The argument of the critics has some validity in that the Japanese units advanced without warning to make a surprise attack on 17 Indian Division on the ‘Basin’ position just south of Kalewa.  However hard fighting by 1st Royal Battalion 9th Jats, 2/5th Gurkhas and 7th Gurkhas stopped the Japanese; in this fighting the British field, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery and the remaining tanks expended their ammunition before destroying their weapons except for a handful of mountain guns that were mule-packed into India.


Special Service Detachments Nos. 1 and 2 (Commando)

SSDs Nos. 1 and 2 operated east and west of the Salween River in Lower Burma, No. 1 being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Milman and No. 2 by Lieutenant Colonel H.C. Brocklehurst; both men had served operationally in Abyssinia.  SSD No. 1 was abandoned by both 1st Burma Division, who it reported to, and the Chinese 6th Army troops who entered eastern Burma.  When Milman realised that Japanese troops were north of his location he marched east into China from where SSD No. 1 was flown to India in late July.  The SSD does not appear to have fought ground actions against the Japanese although Captain Frank Raymond Jocelyn Nicholls, a former Layforce officer, was killed when a Japanese Zero plane shot-up his vehicle.  In China SSD 1 did not become involved in the activities of Mission 204 (10).  Captain William Seymour served with SSD 1 and his Daily Telegraph obituary provides some information on his time in China (11).

Major (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) John Alexander Ralph Milman was later appointed to be an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) with this citation:  This officer was in command of 1st Special Service Detachment operating in the front of 6th Chinese Army in Burma from Jan to May, 1942.  After the Japanese broke through to Lashio the detachment was unable to rejoin the British forces and had to withdraw via KENTUNG to KUNMING through unhealthy and inhospitable country.  During the march, which lasted several weeks, Lt. Col. Milman displayed the highest qualities of leadership and determination and finally brought his contingent to safety with remarkable few losses.  By his personal example and hardihood he kept up the morale of his troops throughout this ordeal in the face of hunger, thirst and disease.

Right: Japanese troops occupying the Yenangyaung oilfields, Burma.

SSD No. 2 had a much rougher time before the survivors reached Assam in north-east India.  This SSD had been deployed west of the Salween River and China was a much more difficult sanctuary to reach.  Brocklehurst and his Adjutant, Captain Lancaster, kept the SSD together whilst crossing the upper Irrawaddy plain but split the unit into small groups when jungle was reached (12).  Brocklehust and many of his men were killed or died on the trek northwards.  Some members of SSD 2 marched with extreme difficulty through the Chaukan Pass into Assam, and this writer has placed a description of that route plus a photograph of some of the Commandos on the website Harry’s Sideshows (13).  It is likely that as they attempted to march out of Burma more members of SSD 2 were killed by starvation and the elements than were killed by the Japanese.


The operational activities of Force Viper

Only 58 of the original 106 Force Viper Marines got out of Burma alive.  Cecil Hampshire’s book On Hazardous Service provides the best description published of Force Viper’s operational activities in Burma.  Seven out of the eight Marines aboard one of the boats were drowned when a sudden storm on the Irrawaddy quickly capsized the vessel.  Johnston took his remaining men up the Irrawaddy, destroying all Burman river craft that they found, before ferrying withdrawing troops across the broad river.  Travelling up the Chindwin he performed similar tasks at Kalewa and Shwegyin.  Then the Marines transported a Gurkha brigade upriver to Sittaung where the boats were destroyed, the Marines acting as rearguard on the brigade’s march into India.  Johnston and three Marines were sent further upriver to Homalin on a special mission delivering cash to a British official to pay head-hunting tribesmen for allowing British and Chinese troops to transit tribal territory, but the official was no longer there to receive the money and most of it was thrown into the river.  After destroying his boat Johnston and his team walked over the high Naga hills into Manipur. 

Major Duncan Johnston, Lieutenant Peter Cave (posthumous award) and Ex.2340 Marine John Hilton Marriott were Mentioned in Despatches.   Two members of the Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve had been attached to Force Viper during most of its adventures and one of them, Lieutenant William Guthrie Temple Penman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (14). 

The unit reached Calcutta on 25 May, followed three weeks later by a Sergeant and seven Marines who were thought to have been killed but who had marched out of northern Burma into Assam.  Another Marine, William Doyle, although wounded by shrapnel in the lower legs pluckily walked out of Burma from Myitkyina to Assam through the deadly Hukawng Valley.  His varied challenges and adventures are well-described in James Leasor’s book The Marine From Mandalay.  Major Duncan Johnston later joined Detachment 385 (HMS Lanka) which contained Royal Marine Commando assault troops specialising in small-boat deception raids and agent insertions and extractions, but he was accidentally shot and killed by one of his own men off the Burma Arakan coast in February 1945; he was buried at sea.


The three Mission 204 contingents

Two books, Iain Adamson’s The Forgotten Men. Commandos in war-time China and John Hay’s well-illustrated On Big Flowery Hill. A soldier’s journal of a secret mission into occupied China, 1942 graphically describe the soul-destroying marching and lack of operational activity endured by the three contingents who went into China as dedicated Mission 204 troops.  More photographs can be found on the Commando Veterans’ Association website (15).  The Nationalist Chinese government did not provide the promised support for Mission 204 and the local Generals who often became violent with each other wanted the British on the ground so that fictitious victories could be proclaimed leading to more weapons, equipment, ammunition and money being requisitioned. 

Regrettably the original commander of Mission 204, Major General L.E. Dennys MC, was killed in an air crash (16) in March 1942; he was replaced by Major General J.M. Bruce.  General Dennys had sponsored the concept of Mission 204 from the start and had committed himself to it; General Bruce looked at the situation dispassionately and recommended a withdrawal as the objective of the Mission was not being achieved.  One Mission 204 contingent appears to have been Australian (17), another manned by the British trainees who came from Malaya, and the third from British troops in Burma.  The Australian War Memorial link in the Sources list below provides an excellent commentary on the mistreatment and under-employment of the three Mission 204 contingents.

In his postscript John Hay, describing the Burma group, states: “Of the 46 men in the Burma contingent who left Kiyang for the forward base, 72% had been stricken by malaria, 40% had suffered from severe diarrhoea or dysentery, and 13% had contracted venereal disease. . . . With only 5 officers and 14 soldiers of the Burma contingent fit for active service, and the two other contingents of Mission 204 equally reduced in number . . . The decision to withdraw was finally made on September 14th, and Mission 204 flew out for India from Kunming, China, on October 29th, 1942.”

This writer recollects meeting one of the Mission 204 Commandos on the Zambian Copperbelt in the mid-1960s.  This man said, with some pride for his unit in his voice, that on one occasion he and his fellow Commandos were so exhausted on a march in China that their officer took off his belt and flogged some of the men forward to prevent them from falling out on the line of march.  The men completed the march and so did not become victims of the harsh winter elements or of local assailants.


The next employment for the Commandos

Some men went with Calvert to Wingate’s Chindits where they were mostly placed in 142nd Commando Company in 77th Indian Infantry Brigade.  Others, particularly officers who had operated in Abyssinia – and John Milman was one of those - avoided Wingate as their experience had taught them that large long-range insertions of men rapidly became counter-productive.  Quite a few of these Commandos found employment with Force 136, the Special Operations Executive arm in the Far East that was based in Calcutta.  In Force 136 they were inserted back into Burma in small groups by parachute to raise, arm and train hill tribesmen for guerrilla operations. 

There can be no doubt that those men who completed Commando training at the Maymyo Bush Warfare School were significantly prepared to cope with the hazards of their marches into China or out of Burma into India.  The investment of military resources into the Bush Warfare School did pay some dividends.