MISSION: ‘the maintenance of an effective force on the
Caucasus front so as to protect the occupied portions of Turkish Armenia and to
prevent the realisation of Pan-Turanian designs’.
Part 1 - The fighting in North West Persia during 1918
Introduction
The start of the Russian Revolution in the
Spring of 1917 heralded the decline of Russia as an effective member of the
alliance that was fighting the Central Powers who were led by Germany and
Turkey. By December of that year
revolutionaries had seized power in Russia and had signed a separate peace with
the Central Powers at Brest-Livotsk.
This resulted in the demoralisation and disintegration of the Russian
forces that had been confronting Turkey in Anatolia and Persia. Turkey was now able to reclaim territory
previously occupied by the Russians, punish those people such as the Armenians
who had collaborated with Russia on Turkish soil, and look to expand Turkish
influence both in the Caucasus region and eastwards.
Above: A British officer from the Dunsterforce watches a Russian instructing a group of Persian police at Resht
The Caucasian states of Armenia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan created a Transcaucasian Federation that eventually declared
itself to be independent from Bolshevik Russia in April 1918. Initially the Federation sought friendly
relations with Turkey but agreement could not be reached on border demarcation
and fighting commenced. This situation
was compounded by Germany becoming involved on the side of Georgia, that state
declaring itself independent from the Federation in May. Turks fighting Georgian troops found themselves
fighting Germans who were assisting Georgia.
Both German and Turkish eyes and interests were focused eastwards on the
Azerbaijani oilfields at Baku on the Caspian Sea.
Above: Map of important locations in the Caspian region For further Maps please go HERE
The Turkish War Minister, Ismail Enver
Pasha, had ambitions to unite the Turkic people of Central Asia with Anatolian
Turkey. On hearing of the fighting in
Georgia Enver quickly went there accompanied by the German Chief of the Turkish
General Staff, General Hans Von Seeckt.
Differences were resolved between German and Turkish policies in the
region, and Enver ordered two weak Turkish armies to prepare to advance
eastwards. The Ninth Army was to advance
through Persian Azerbaijan with Tabriz as its immediate objective, whilst the
Third Army advanced upon Baku to seize the oilfields there. Neither of these Turkish armies contained
German troops; the Germans were busy concentrating a weak division at Tiflis
and they watched Enver’s eastern advances with interest but did not directly
support them, preferring to thwart them where they could. But German training missions were already in
Persia attempting to achieve a change of government that would bring Persia
into the war as an ally of the Central Powers.
The
British reaction
During the Autumn of 1917 Britain had
observed the decline of Russian military capability on the Caucasian Front with
deep concern. It was vital that Caspian
oil and cotton (used in the manufacture of munitions) be prevented from getting
into German hands. Britain also feared that the Central Powers would now move
through neutral Persia (previously they had been restrained by an effective
Russian military presence in the north of that country) to de-stabilise the
Indian North-West Frontier and beyond, and bring Afghanistan into the war
against Britain. Stability in India was
a vital British requirement as a further half-million Indian soldiers were
being recruited and trained at this time, with the aim of establishing 67 more
infantry battalions, to be used primarily in overseas theatres.
Above: Indian mountain gunners and Hampshire soldiers near Manjil Bridge
Some modern historical commentators have
derided this British fear. However during
the war Germany promoted strong insurrections in Persia and infiltrated small
groups of men and weapons through the country to Afghanistan; the Germans and
the Turks did not need to move large armies through Persia, as well-led and
financed training missions could achieve their aims. During the war German support for the Indian
Ghadr revolutionary movement and Turkish calls for a Muslim Holy War caused
serious problems in India and Burma, including mutiny in some military
units. The Afghanistan threat was potent
as was shown in 1919 when that country invaded India, encouraging thousands of
border tribesmen to join in the fight against the British.
During late 1917 the War
Cabinet in London wanted to move British troops into the Caucasus but none were
available. An alternative plan was
adopted to send a British Military Mission to the Georgian capital, Tiflis;
this mission would not be a fighting unit but would contain instructors and staff
officers capable of financing, training and organising indigenous Caucasian
units that would fight the Turks. The
only conventional part of the mission was to be a British Armoured Car
Brigade. It was determined that the best
possible route to Tiflis was overland from Baghdad through Persia to the
Caspian Sea, then by boat to Baku, and onwards by train to Tiflis. Unfortunately events in Tiflis were already making
this British plan redundant.
Command of the British Mission was given to
Major General Lionel Charles Dunsterville CB.
He was a well-liked and respected Indian Army officer and a fluent
Russian speaker, with operational experience on the Indian North-West Frontier
and in China. As Dunsterville states in
his account of DUNSTERFORCE, the name by which his mission became known: ‘My own
knowledge of the Russian language and known sympathy with Russia had probably a
good deal to do with my selection for the task’. His mission was: ‘the maintenance of an effective force on the Caucasus front so as to
protect the occupied portions of Turkish Armenia and to prevent the realisation
of Pan-Turanian designs’. The then British Military Agent in Tiflis was
Lieutenant Colonel G.D. Pike MC, 9th Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army, and
Dunsterville was to take over the appointment from him.
Dunsterville’s resources were a large
treasure chest, the Armoured Car Brigade, a small group of staff officers,
another small group of Russian officers, and around 200 officers and 200 Non
Commissioned Officers selected chiefly from Canadian, Australian, New Zealand
and South African units. Many of these men had been decorated for gallantry in
the field. This was a Special Forces
unit, tasked with a strategic Special Forces mission, long before Special
Forces were officially invented, glamorised and awarded cult-hero status.
In the event DUNSTERFORCE did not get to
Tiflis, but it was involved in heavy fighting against the Turkish Third Army
around Baku and in serious fighting against the Turkish Ninth Army and its
Persian allies in northern Persia. This
first article describes the important military actions in Persia, and a second
article will describe military operations around Baku and the Caspian Sea.
Dunsterville
moves into Persia
Lionel Dunsterville’s first major problem
was that he could not concentrate his mission before it was deployed; he set
off himself first with a small staff hoping that his men and vehicles would
quickly follow. In the event some parts
of the Armoured Car Brigade did not arrive in Persia until after DUNSTERFORCE
had been disbanded. The second major
problem was the attitude of the theatre commander in Mesopotamia, Lieutenant
General W.R. Marshall KCB, who had succeeded in command after General F.S. Maude’s
death from illness in Baghdad. Marshall strenuously
objected to the concept of DUNSTERFORCE because he had to logistically support
it across Persia, but more personally he vehemently objected to the fact that Lionel
Dunsterville reported directly to London.
From this moment onwards Marshall’s somewhat petulant opposition to DUNSTERFORCE
grew and Dunsterville’s chances of achieving some kind of success receded.
Above: Dunsterforce sword drill in Persia
On January 24th 1918
Dunsterville despatched an advance party under Major Sir Walter Barttelot DSO,
Coldstream Guards, who was accompanied by Captain G.M. Goldsmith, Intelligence
Corps, and an armoured car commanded by Lieutenant C.M. Singer, Devonshire
Regiment and Motor Machine Gun Corps.
Barttelot’s mission was to move to Hamadan in Persia and ensure petrol
supplies for Dunsterville’s group when it arrived. Three days later Dunsterville left
Mesopotamia with 41 Ford cars with Army Service Corps drivers, eleven staff
officers and two clerks. The drivers took rifles and an infantry staff officer
took a Lewis Gun. Critically the convoy
carried a large amount of Persian silver and British gold coins, and the need
for adequate protection of this treasure was soon to constrain Dunsterville’s
actions.
After struggles through snowdrifts the 41
Ford cars reached Kermanshah on 3rd February. Here Dunsterville made contact with 1,200 Russian
Cossacks under the command of Colonel Lazar Bicherakov, a courageous and
charismatic Ossetian who was to be a staunch ally of the British in northern
Persia and the Caucasus. Bicherakov and
his Caucasian Cossacks were fiercely anti-Bolshevik. Lieutenant Colonel C.H. Clutterbuck, 125th
Napier’s Rifles, Indian Army, was the British liaison officer with the
Russians, and he was assisted by New Zealand army signallers manning a Russian
wireless set. Clutterbuck was a Russian
language specialist and popular with the Cossacks; the New Zealanders were from
an Australian and New Zealand wireless squadron.
Dunsterville pushed on the next day, now
accompanied by one of Bicherakov’s officers acting as a guide. Due to snowfalls the convoy did not reach
Hamadan until 11th February, although Dunsterville rode ahead and
reached the town four days earlier.
Fortunately the road being followed was an ancient trade route and old
serais, designed to shelter passing camel caravans, were located along the
way. At Hamdan the advance party was
waiting as was Brigadier General Offley Shore, CB, CIE, DSO, Indian Army, who
was returning from Tiflis and waiting to brief Dunsterville on the current
situation there.
Above: Dunsterforce car and driver
Also at Hamadan was the Russian Lieutenant
General Nikolai Baratov, commander of the Russian troops in northern
Persia. This force had performed well as
part of the Imperial Russian Army and had pushed a Turkish advance out of
Persia and back into Mesopotamia. But
now Baratov’s command had disintegrated and most of his remaining soldiers
refused to accept orders as they tried to get home. Dunsterville carefully negotiated seperately
with Bicherakov and Baratov. He paid
Baratov for items of military equipment purchased and he paid Bicherakov when
he needed the Cossacks to fight.
Whilst the convoy re-organised at Hamadan Captain
Goldsmith was sent ahead again to reconnoitre the route to Enzeli and locate
petrol supplies. In the event George
Goldsmith then parted from DUNSTERFORCE, as he successfully reached Enzeli on
the Caspian Sea, took a boat to Baku and then the train to Tiflis where he
joined Colonel Pike. After Geoffrey Pike
was killed during a fight between Bolsheviks and Terek Cossacks in August 1918
Goldsmith became Acting Commanding Officer of the Caucasus Military Agency
until he was arrested by Bolsheviks two months later; but long before those
events DUNSTERFORCE’s mission had been re-focused away from Tiflis.
The
advance to and withdrawal from Enzeli
Dunsterville left Hamadan on 14th
February when a pass immediately ahead was cleared of snow and his convoy, now
including Cecil Singer’s armoured car, made good time down an excellent
Russian-constructed road to Kasvin. This
was an important town of 50,000 inhabitants and the road to Tehran, the Persian
capital, forked eastwards from there.
DUNSTERFORCE was now approaching territory controlled
by a group of Persians known as the Jangalis because they operated from the
heavily forested or jungle-like land in Gilan Province south of the Caspian
Sea. The Jangali revolutionary leader,
Mirza Kuchik Khan, had vowed not to let the British through his region. Kuchik Khan, like many Persians had felt
humiliated by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that was used to allow
‘Spheres of Influence’ to be created in Persia, the Russian sphere being almost
the entire north of the country and the British sphere being in the south-east,
adjacent to the Indian border. So far
the Jangalis had resisted attempts by both the Tehran government and the local
Russian forces to destroy them. A German
mission under Colonel von Passchen was training Kuchik Khan’s men who were
equipped with rifles and Turkish machine guns.
Above: DUNSTERFORCE convoy near Birkandi
The British convoy drove on towards the
Caspian on 16th February, pushing its way through hordes of Russian
pro-Bolshevik soldiers who had demobilised themselves and who just wanted to go
home with whatever booty they could carry.
The convoy crossed the bridge at Menjil and drove on to Resht, not
knowing that both locations would shortly have to be fought over. At Resht Dunsterville met with the British Acting
Vice-Consul Charles Maclaren, who was soon to be captured and
incarcerated by the Jangalis along with Captain E.W.C. Noel CIE, 91st
Punjabis, Indian Army attached to the Political Department. Noel would be carrying despatches from Tiflis
for DUNSTERFORCE at the time of his capture.
The cars then drove to Enzeli on the Caspian where trouble started to
mount.
At that time Belgians managed the Persian
customs for the weak Persian central government, just as Swedes managed the
Persian Gendarmerie. The Belgians in
Enzeli hosted the DUNSTERFORCE convoy but Russian Bolsheviks controlled the
port. After negotiations, which
Dunsterville always preferred before military action because of the weakness of
his force, the realisation came home that the convoy was not going to be
allowed to board a ship, and even if it did then the Bolsheviks controlling
Baku would arrest Dunsterville and his men on arrival at that port. To stay in Enzeli was to invite destruction
at the hands of Bolsheviks and Jangalis with the consequent loss of the
treasure chests that were to finance anti-Central Powers military activity in the
Caucasus. Dunsterville maintained good
relations with the Bolsheviks controlling Enzeli, obtaining all the petrol he
needed, and before dawn on 20th February his convoy was back on the
road to Hamdan. Later that day a
detachment of Red Guards arrived at Enzeli from Baku, just too late to
accomplish its mission of arresting the British soldiers.
At Resht Dunsterville learned that the
reason why his convoy had not been attacked on the Enzeli-Resht road was
because the Jangalis had been uncertain whether or not the withdrawing Russians
would fight alongside the British.
Overdue maintenance on the cars was performed at Resht under the
supervision of M2/130904 Serjeant R.W. Harris, Army Service Corps, and then the
convoy drove off to arrive back at Hamadan on the evening of 25th
February. Dunsterville chose Hamadan as
his firm base because of its strategic location within Persia and its healthy
climate, and here he spent time explaining his intentions to the local Persian
administrators and attempting to secure their support for his activities. This was a delicate task as Persia was still
a neutral country and most Persians resented the constant intrusions onto
Persian soil practised by both the Allies and the Central Powers.
Above: Persian levies being drilled near Hamdan
Interlude
at Hamadan
Dunsterville received orders through the
Russian wireless station, from London via Baghdad, to remain where he was,
monitor the situation inside Persia, and to advance when he could. When the snows melted more elements of DUNSTERFORCE
were marched up from the holding camp at Baghdad. Many more stores,
particularly petrol, oil and lubricants were brought up. This was much to the exasperation of General
Marshall who had to watch most of his motor transport being deployed into
Persia, although as Commander of the Mesopotamia Theatre he was not being
required to mount significant operational activity at that time.
A severe famine was prevailing in western
Persia because of predations by Turkish and Persian troops during the previous
years that were now compounded by the avarice of local speculative traders, and
people were dying in the streets and barren fields. Cases of cannibalism in Hamadan were being
reported. DUNSTERFORCE embarked on a
large programme of famine-relief work, employing Persians on civil construction
projects, particularly road improvements.
The South African Brigadier General J.J. Byron DSO was placed in charge
of famine-relief operations, whilst the Canadian Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Warden
DSO was appointed town Commandant of Hamadan, with Captain F.P. Cockerell MC,
Intelligence Corps, as Assistant Provost Marshall.
Another activity was the recruiting and
training of local levies and bands of irregulars; theoretically the levies
would be able to guard vulnerable points anywhere whilst the irregulars would
defend their own villages. Major J.J. McCarthy DSO MC, Northern Rhodesian
Police, and Captain R.S. Engledue, 89th Punjabis, Indian Army, were
leading figures in this activity. Concurrently
a British intelligence organisation was created under Captain Macan Saunders
DSO, 36th Sikhs, Indian Army, and tasked with reporting Turkish
movements. Meanwhile Turkish military
instructors were busily at work training their own militias in villages
surrounding Hamadan, and Russian troop movements were being attacked whilst
British officers were occasionally sniped at from a distance.
After consultations the new Chief of the
Imperial General Staff in London, General Sir Henry Wilson, ordered in March
that DUNSTERFORCE was to frustrate enemy penetration through north-west Persia and
that General Marshall was to be responsible for this, using Lionel Dunsterville
as his local commander in Persia. Meanwhile in Baku the Bolshevik and Armenian
defenders were resisting the advance of the Turkish Third Army and they were
being assisted in this by German refusals to allow Turkish troops onto the
Tiflis-Baku railway. In the southern
Caucasus the situation deteriorated by the week as the Georgians became
increasingly accommodating towards the Germans and the Turks began transiting
through Armenia into Azerbaijan, and it was Dunsterville’s opinion that only
Allied military units and formations could influence the situation now -
British instructors and gold would only complicate and exacerbate it.
Bicherakov now decided that as the snow was
clearing he would take his men out of Persia to pursue anti-Bolshevik
activities in the Caucasus, but Dunsterville persuaded him to delay the move,
promising to support the Cossack march to Enzeli with British armoured cars and
aircraft which were now flying into Hamadan.
Meanwhile to counter both the progress and the propaganda activities of
the Turkish Ninth Army and German training teams in Persia who were proclaiming
German success on the Western Front, Dunsterville sent out two small missions
to both show the Allied flag and to search for tribal leaders who might be
prepared to fight the Turkish advance from Tabriz. The New Zealander Major Fred Starnes DSO, the
Canterbury Regiment, was dispatched to Bijar, 100 miles north-west of Hamadan
whilst Major Lewis Wagstaff CIE, 2nd Queen’s Own Rajput Light
Infantry, Indian Army, pushed westwards along the Tabriz road from Kasvin. Starnes was also tasked with trying to make
contact with a large Jelu community, the name given to a combined group of
Armenians and Assyrian Christians that was isolated but successfully resisting
Turkish advances around Lake Urmiah.
April saw more DUNSTERFORCE personnel arriving
in Hamadan, plus three more armoured cars from the 6th Light
Armoured Motor Battery and ‘C’ Squadron 14th (The King’s) Hussars, a
British Regular Army cavalry regiment. In
May Dunsterville visited Tehran to consult with the British Ambassador, and
also that month the fourth and final party of DUNSTERFORCE arrived in Hamadan
accompanied by a group of specially selected anti-Bolshevik Russian
officers.
Above: A parade of Jelus being drilled by 'Dunsterforce' soldiers at Hamadan
The Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet in
London made an important policy change on 27th May, telegraphing
that DUNSTERFORCE was now not to attempt to get to Tiflis but was to reach the
Caspian Sea and take control of the shipping fleet there. The military priority
was to secure the Mesopotamia-Enzeli road.
This instruction was modified to allow Dunsterville or one or more of
his officers to go to Baku, at General Marshall’s discretion, to reconnoitre
the task of demolishing Baku’s oil wells. General Marshall was to find the troops needed
by DUNSTERFORCE. But Lionel Dunsterville
was never to get the troops he needed to complete the tasks that he would undertake,
and by now many of his men were dispersed around northern Persia on
intelligence, famine-relief and training duties.
Concurrent with DUNSTERFORCE operations
were a British military move into Russian Transcaspia from Meshed in north-eastern
Persia and the military operations of the British-sponsored South Persia Rifles
in the south of the country.
The
road to Resht and the Menjil Bridge
On 1st June DUNSTERFORCE moved to Kasvin,
leaving Brigadier John Byron in charge of the Line of Communication at Hamadan
where Lieutenant Colonel W. Donnan, a re-enlistment from the Indian Army
Retired List, was commanding an efficient militia. Kasvin was an unhealthy location and the
DUNSTERFORCE Senior Medical Officer, Major John H. Brunskill DSO, Royal Army
Medical Corps, soon had too many patients. An important arrival from Baghdad was
Lieutenant Colonel J.C.M. Hoskyn DSO, 44th Merwara Infantry, Indian
Army; John Hoskyn became the DUNSTERFORCE principle staff officer (GSO1) for Military
Operations.
At long last a detachment of the Dunsterforce
Armoured Car Brigade (known as DUNCARS) was nearing Kasvin. This brigade had been formed in England from
a Royal Navy Air Service armoured car unit that had been serving in Russia
until 1917. When this detachment arrived
it would patrol the line of communication whilst Bicherakov seized Enzeli. However the movements of DUNCARS were
restricted by a shortage of lubricants and spare parts in Mesopotamia, and by
the Rubberine tyres, designed for Russian cold-weather use, solidifying in the
Persian heat and breaking back axles.
The attitudes of both London and General
Marshall became more flexible over Baku in early June, both parties agreeing
that Dunsterville could decide what force to send to Baku, but that General
Marshall would retain overall command of DUNSTERFORCE operations. But a week later the uncertainty over exactly
what DUNSTERFORCE was expected to achieve surfaced again when General Wilson in
London expressed doubts about how long a British force in Baku could survive
against a determined Turkish attack backed by the local Muslim Tartar community
that was strongly pro-Turk and anti-Armenian; in the event this was a prescient
comment but it displayed a difference in opinion between the Generals in London
and the politicians on the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet. The British wanted control of the Caspian
Sea, but they shied away from the reality that Baku had to be held by a
military force in order to maintain that control; Lionel Dunsterville was left
to make the new policy work as best he could whilst his military masters commenced
distancing themselves from possible failure.
On 10th June, negotiations with
Kuchik Khan to persuade him to become neutral having failed, DUNSTERFORCE
marched out to fight. Bicherakov’s
column consisting of two squadrons of Cossack cavalry and a detachment of
infantry, a section of Russian mountain artillery plus ‘C’ Squadron 14th
(The King’s) Hussars, advanced towards Resht with the British squadron
leading. In support were two British
armoured cars and two British aeroplanes.
At Menjil, half way to the Caspian, was a 200-metre long, 5-span girder
bridge over the Kizil Uzun River that the Jangalis were defending with an
estimated 2,000 men and several machine guns.
However the Jangali defences were poorly sited and vital ground was not
occupied despite the presence of Colonel von Passchen.
Above: A repair team works on a British armoured car
To test the determination of the defences
the two aircraft flew overhead without firing and were met by widespread
Jangali rifle fire. Bicherakov then led
his men towards the bridge and dispersed a Jangali picquet by shouting and
waving his stick at it. Von Passchen
appeared under a flag of truce demanding a parley in an attempt to separate the
Cossacks from the British troops but Bicherakov verbally dismissed him. Once von Passchen was out of the way the
Russian gunners opened fire, the Cossack cavalry moved towards the enemy’s
right whilst the armoured cars engaged from his left and the infantry
advanced. This caused the Jangalis on
the near side of the river to flee from their trenches towards the bridge where
many stragglers were captured. All the Jangalis
now fled from their positions and Bicherakov’s column pursued them for 16
kilometres towards Resht. Bicherakov and
his Cossacks pushed on to Enzeli after reorganising, leaving detachments at
Resht and two other points on the road.
Captain A.V. ‘Darkie’ Pope’s 14th Hussars guarded the Menjil
Bridge.
Dunsterville needed to get more men forward
from Hamadan before he could secure his line of communications whilst he
advanced. General Marshall had sent
forward a composite battalion, half 1/4th Hampshires and half 1/2nd
Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C.L. Matthews, Durham Light
Infantry attached to and commanding 1/4th Hampshires. This unit was accompanied by Right Section
(two guns) of 21st Kohat Mountain Battery (Frontier Force), Indian
Army. The battalion and the gunners were
titled ‘Matthews’ Column’. Some of the
Hampshires now joined Dunsterville but the Jangalis, their morale recovered,
gave them a warm welcome on 18th June by successfully ambushing a
party on a small bridge at Siah Rud. Captain
R.C Durnford was killed and six men were wounded.
Three days later another successful Jangali
ambush was sprung. For gallantry
displayed on this occasion Lieutenant Geoffrey Watt, Motor Transport, Army
Service Corps, received a Military Cross
with the citation: For conspicuous gallantry and
devotion to duty between Menjil and Resht, Persia on 21st June, 1918. He was in
command of a convoy of 66 vans which was heavily attacked by hostile
irregulars. Eight vans were put out of action, but by his entire disregard of
danger and good conduct he managed to salve them. Later, on three occasions he
went out with a small party under fire and salved four more vans which had been
abandoned.
Then the Gurkhas became involved and the
fight-back began. On 29th
June Captain Knightley Holler Coxe, Indian Army Reserve of Officers attached to
1/2nd Gurkhas, won a Military
Cross at Imam Zadeh Hachem: For
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near Stahmd Bridge, Persia, on 29th
June 1918. He organised and executed a brilliantly successful attack on an
enemy position, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy at very slight cost to his
own force. He displayed marked ability and initiative, coolly meeting every
contingency that arose with marked courage and skill.
The prominent use of Gurkha kukhris during
this action gave the Jangalis something to think about, but they were still
prepared to attack as events in Resht during the next month showed. Elsewhere at this time there were reported to
be around 2,000 Turkish troops in Tabriz, and Wagstaff’s mission was ordered to
establish itself at Mianeh and to patrol forward of there.
Above: Gurkha Vickers MG Team
Events
in Baku
Dunsterville moved his headquarters forward
to Enzeli appointing Major W.S.W. Browne, 44th Merwara Infantry,
Indian Army, to command British troops and levies in that town. The Resht area was commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Matthews from a British camp sited just outside the town. London now became critical both of
Dunsterville’s perceived lack of action and of his failure to communicate
regularly with Marshall. Dunsterville
was expected to seize Enzeli by force from the Bolsheviks, and he was not to
rely so heavily on Bicherakov who might prove to be untrustworthy. London impressed upon Marshall that now his
most important area of operations was north-western Persia, as control of the
Caspian was vital, and the British were contemplating purchasing the accumulated
stock of cotton held in Krasnovodsk, the port opposite Baku on the eastern
shore of the Caspian Sea. A strategic
assessment of Turkey’s current war aims indicated that the Turks now accepted
the loss of their Arabian provinces so they were attempting to compensate by
moving eastwards into Turkic Asia. A
further legitimate concern both to London, the Indian government in Delhi and
the British Ambassador in Persia was that 38,000 Austrian and Hungarian
prisoners of war held in Central Asia were being released and armed by the
Bolsheviks.
To gain military control of the Caspian Sea
a Royal Navy party of 5 officers, 86 ratings and 12 guns suitable for mounting
on the Caspian steamers was despatched to Enzeli from Baghdad under the command
of Commodore D.T. Norris. Also the
British 39th Infantry Brigade was now ordered to move forward from
Mesopotamia to Hamadan; this move commenced but only gradually because of motor
transport shortages.
Marshall described in detail his enormous logistics
problems in supporting DUNSTERFORCE but in a rather scathing tone. This prompted General Sir Henry Wilson to
warn him privately ‘that the Eastern Committee of the War
Cabinet thought I was not very zealous in carrying out their ideas and asked me
to keep out of my communiques anything which might indicate an unwillingness to
do so’.
Whilst Marshall was in India on leave Major
General Hew D. Fanshawe CB, the acting theatre commander, visited DUNSTERFORCE
from Baghdad after Dunsterville had visited him, and concluded that
Dunsterville was doing the best that he could with the force he had. Fanshawe understood that there were different
categories of Bolshevik and different shades of Bolshevism and that Dunsterville
was correct to negotiate before using force, particularly as the Jangalis still
held Edward Noel hostage. Lack of
regular and detailed contact with Marshall was due to lack of adequate radio
communications, but motor wireless equipment was being sent forward as were
pack mules for off-road deployments.
Fanshawe concluded by stating that so far Dunsterville had done exactly
what he had been tasked to do – he had frustrated enemy penetration through
north-west Persia and secured the land route from Mesopotamia to the Caspian
Sea. Fanshawe also saw good reasons for
sending troops to Baku; London concurred agreeing that two infantry battalions,
an artillery field battery and armoured cars could be sent to Baku under
Dunsterville’s command.
Meanwhile Bicherakov had decided that his
best tactic was to declare himself a Bolshevik so that he could gain a footing
in Azerbaijan, and he accepted the post of commander of the Red Army in the
Caucasus. He visited Baku where he found
arguments developing between pro and anti-British Bolsheviks that DUNSTERFORCE
could exploit, then he returned to Enzeli to embark his men. Bicherakov’s force sailed on 3rd
July accompanied by a few attached DUNSTERVILLE staff officers and four British
armoured cars.
Events now moved quickly. A British intelligence officer from the
Military Mission in Meshed, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones, Indian Army Reserve
of Officers, crossed the Caspian to Baku and on his return reported on the weak
state of Baku’s defences, and on the fact that the Germans in Tiflis were
obtaining all the oil (through the Baku-Batum pipeline) and cotton that they could
purchase in Baku. Information supplied
by Ranald MacDonell, the knowledgeable British Vice Consul in Baku whom
Teague-Jones had met, stated that many crews on Caspian steamers were
anti-Bolshevik and that a British military presence was urgently needed in Baku
to prevent the town falling to the Turks, but he advised against using force at
Enzeli. When Bicherakov’s Cossacks
entered Baku pro-British sentiment was expressed by some important citizens in
Baku, and on 26th July all the Bolshevik government members resigned
to be replaced by a new government proclaiming itself to be Centro-Caspian and
in need of British assistance.
Colonel Clutterbuck, the liaison officer
with the Cossacks, informed Dunsterville of this about-turn by the Baku
authorities but he also advised that Bicherakov was moving northwards towards
Derbend. The Turks were holding ground
overlooking Baku and were within 3,000 metres of the wharves. Bicherakov was not getting the ammunition and
supplies that he needed from Baku and he was concerned about being tricked and
trapped in that town. He suggested that
DUNSTERFORCE now land at Derbend, but that proposal was not acceptable to the
British. Bicherakov, his British liason
and staff officers and three DUNCAR armoured cars under Captain W.L. Crossing
DSC, Machine Gun Corps (Motors), marched north whilst the Turks inexplicably
withdrew. As the Official History
states: ‘General
Dunsterville offers the opinion that the movement northwards of Bicherakov’s
detachment, although apparently justifiable at the time, was a mistake which
contributed mainly to the ultimate fall of Baku’.
Thus Bicherakov regrettably marched away
from DUNSTERFORCE. From their first
meeting in Kermanshah in February Dunsterville had realised how vitally
important Bicherakov and his Cossacks were for the accomplishment of British
strategy in the region, as DUNSTERFORCE was not structured as a combat
formation, and initially it lacked artillery and cavalry. But others in more distant and peaceful offices
did not share Dunsterville’s appreciation.
Above: Terek Cossack Artillery
But the future could not be predicted and
Dunsterville, having obtained the agreement of the Enzeli authorities who were
now friendly with the Centro-Caspians at Baku, rapidly organised a group of
liaison and staff officers with an escort from the 1/4th Hampshires to
sail to Baku. This group, under the
command of the DUNSTERFORCE principal intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Claude B. Stokes CIE, 3rd Skinner’s Horse, Indian Army, reached Baku
on 4th August. In the
opposite direction the Russian linguist Lieutenant Colonel Reginald St Clair
Battine, 21st Cavalry, Indian Army, went with a small group to
Krasnovodsk on 6th August to establish relations with the
anti-Bolshevik authorities there. Later
in August a small mission was sent to Lenkoran, on the western Caspian Sea
coastline, halfway between Enzeli and Alyat, at the request of its Russian
community.
The
fight for Resht
On 20th July around 2,500
Jangalis supported by a number of Turks and Germans under von Passchen attacked
Resht. Colonel Matthews had with him 300
rifles from his 1/4th Hampshires, 150 Gurkha rifles under Captain
G.M. McCleverty, 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, two guns of 21st
(Kohat) Mountain battery transported in Ford vans, and two armoured cars. Most of the British troops were in their base
camp outside the town which was heavily attacked but detachments were inside
Resht guarding buildings. At the base
the enemy were driven back, leaving over 100 dead on the ground and 50
prisoners, including some Austrian and Hungarian former prisoners of war now
released by the Bolsheviks, in the hands of Matthews’ Column.
For gallantry displayed during this attack Lieutenant
Henry Folliott Scott Stokes, 1/4th Hampshires, was awarded a Military Cross: For conspicuous gallantry and
devotion to duty at Resht, Persia, on 20th July, 1918. He went out constantly
to the front line under heavy fire to report on the situation, sending back
information of the greatest importance. Throughout the operations he carried on
his arduous duties with remarkable zeal and daring. His services, rendered
under trying circumstances, were of great value.
However and more seriously another large
group of Jangalis had entered Resht and attacked the small British posts at the
British Consulate, the telegraph office and the bank, which contained bullion. Colonel Matthews dispatched Captain McCleverty
with 100 rifles and the armoured cars to withdraw the guards at the Consulate
and reinforce the other posts within the town.
This was easier said than done in the maze of alleys within the town and
bitter street-fighting started that was to last for several days.
Two Military
Crosses were awarded to officers of the Motor Machine Gun Corps. Captain Geoffrey Noel Gawler: For
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Rasht, Persia, on 20th July,
1918. When his two cars were held up by a barricade across a road he exposed
himself fearlessly in order to direct the demolition of the obstacle. Though
severely wounded, he remained with his cars, eventually bringing them back
safely. He only allowed his wounds to be attended to when he had made all
arrangements for the despatch of his cars on another expedition.
and Lt. Cecil Mortimer Singer, Devon
Regiment and 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery: For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to
duty at Resht, Persia, on 20th July, 1918. During an advance through a town he
kept his car well in front of the column, and bore the brunt of the fighting in
the narrow streets. In spite of heavy fire from rifles and bombs he pushed
steadily on, and by his pluck-and determination performed exceptionally fine
work. On a previous occasion, when his car was put out of action, he speedily repaired
it, under most difficult conditions, and brought it into action again at a
critical moment.
Another Military Cross was awarded to Subadar Major Tulsiram Gharti, 1/2nd
Gurkhas: For conspicuous gallantry and
devotion to duty at Resht on 20th July 1918. During the attack by an enemy on a town he
led his men with exceptional ability and dash, and by the rapidity of his
advance inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, taking a number of prisoners. Later he displayed marked initiative and
daring in the relief of a besieged garrison.
His conduct throughout the operation was splendid. Distinguished
Conduct Medals were awarded to: 1200248 Corporal
(Company Quarter Master Sergeant) D. Kemp, 1/4th Hampshires: For
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Resht, on 20th July, 1918. During
an enemy counter-attack the small party he was with became separated, and got
engaged with a party of the enemy holding a house; after his officer (Lieutenant
John Graham Wilkinson, 1/4th Hampshires)had been killed, and the
majority of the men wounded, this N.C.O. assumed command, collected a few
reinforcements, and skilfully withdrew his party.
and to 201830 Private (Acting Serjeant) F.
Mells, 1/4th Hampshires: For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to
duty at Resht, on 20th July, 1918, in command of a building heavily attacked by
the enemy. His party held out for eight hours, inflicting appreciable losses on
the enemy until a relief reached them. Serjeant Mells displayed fine qualities
of initiative and leadership under trying circumstances.
Two men of the 1/2nd Gurkhas
received Indian Orders of Merit. 3695 Havildar Kule Thapa: He
was in command of a small guard that was in a house surrounded by the
enemy. Although heavily attacked and
hard-pressed for nine hours, he beat off all attacks until relief arrived. He behaved throughout with the greatest
coolness and resource, inspiring his men by his magnificent example. This non-commissioned officer has previously
done good work in carrying out daring patrols and bringing back valuable
information.
and 3966 Lance Naik Kuman Singh Gurung: It
was largely due to the skill and initiative with which this non-commissioned
officer used his Lewis Gun that his platoon was able to advance as rapidly as
it did. On one occasion when heavy
enfilade fire from a house was delaying the advance, he left two men with a
Lewis gun to give covering fire and with the remainder of his section rushed
the house, killing a number of the enemy, including an officer, and taking
several prisoners.
For the operations in Resht and at Imam
Zadeh Hachem a month previously awards of the Indian Distinguished Service Medal were made to nine officers and men
of 1/2nd Gurkhas: Subadar
Aiman Rana; Jemadar Nandbir Thapa; 3489 Havildar Tilakchand Gurung; 199 Lance
Naik Kalu Gharti; 3222 Lance Naik Maniraj Gurung; 1833 Lance Naik Balbir Rai;
1234 Rifleman Singbir Thapa; 455 Rifleman Kahar Sing Rana and 4535 Rifleman
Jagia Khattrie.
Two
men of Right Section 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery also won Indian Distinguished Service Medals for
gallant and resourceful actions at Resht: 403 Havildar Jaggat Singh and 152
Gunner Kishen Singh. The Section had
lost an officer, Lieutenant Maurice Richard Wheatley Johnson, Indian Army
Reserve of Officers, in late June when he was ambushed on the Enzeli road, captured
and then murdered by Jangalis.
A Distinguished
Service Order was awarded to Captain Guy Massy McCleverty MC, 1/2nd
Gurkhas: For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Resht, Persia, on
20th July, 1918. He was in command of a relief party sent to extricate a force
besieged in a building. He displayed great courage and initiative, and it was
mainly due to his resource and daring leadership that the relief was
successfully accomplished. His work throughout the operations was of a very
high order.
Lieutenant Colonel Claud Leonard Matthews,
Durham Light Infantry attached to Hampshire Regiment, had himself been
prominent during the fighting and he later received a Distinguished Service Order but without a published citation.
Matthews’ Column had taken over 50
casualties but by the end of July Resht was cleared of all enemy troops and Kuchik
Khan negotiated for peace; hostilities with the Jangalis ceased on 12th
August. Attacks by the Martinsyde
aircraft of ‘B’ Flight, No 72 Squadron, Royal Air Force, operating from Khasvin
had been instrumental in demonstrating to the Jangalis that they could not compete
with DUNSTERFORCE. The British hostage
Edward Noel was released, Vice-Consul Charles McClaren having escaped earlier,
and Kuchik Khan became the largest contractor supplying rice for the British
forces in Gilan Province.
Above: Persian road workers in the Kerind Valley
The
rescue of the Assyrian and Armenian Christians
Whilst Dunsterville was occupied with
reinforcing Baku his men elsewhere in northern Persia were fighting Turks and
their local allies. Fred Starnes had
found a Turkish force at Sauj Bulaq that prevented him from contacting the Jelus
at Lake Urmia. A temporary re-fuelling airfield
was constructed at Mianeh that allowed Lieutenant K.M. Pennington to fly from
Kasvin to Urmia, where on 8th July he bravely landed unsure of who
exactly was on the ground firing rifles into the air. The Assyrian ladies treated him with
adoration as their saviour, and he arranged with the Jelu spiritual and
military leader, Aga Petros, that a consignment of money, arms and ammunition
would be available for collection from DUNSTERFORCE at Sain Kaleh on 23rd
July. Kenneth Misson Pennington was to
be awarded the Air Force Cross.
Right: Stanley George Savige DSO MC when a Subaltern
A DUNSTERFORCE party under Captain S.G.
Savige MC, 24th Battalion Australian Infantry, was waiting at Sain
Kaleh on the due date; they had with them for Aga Petros a train of pack mules
carrying 45,000 pounds sterling in Persian silver coins, 12 Lewis light machine
guns and 100,000 rounds of ammunition.
But the Assyrians were late and the escort, two squadrons of 14th
Hussars, who had been carrying quantities of the large silver Krans coins in
their saddlebags, and a section from 15th Machine Gun Squadron,
Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry), began to run short of grain for their horses. Despite Savige’s objections Lieutenant
Colonel E.J. Bridges MC, 14th Hussars, the escort commander,
insisted on a withdrawal to Bijar but at the half-way point he permitted Savige
and his party to remain at Takan Tepe and raise a levy from the local Afshah
tribe.
On 3rd August Aga Petros and
2,000 of his men met up with Savige, but news of a disaster at Urmia quickly
followed. Without Aga Petros’ unifying
presence many of the Armenians had suddenly deserted their positions facing the
Turks and had fled with their families to British-occupied Mesopotamia. The 80,000 Assyrians had become demoralized by
rumours of Aga Petros’ defeat and death, and they fled towards Sain Kaleh. This allowed the Turks and their local
irregular Kurdish allies to pounce on the fleeing Christians, killing thousands
and seizing livestock, loot and young females for sale into slavery. The Assyrian rearguard was being led and
inspired by two American Presbyterian Missionaries, Doctor William A. Shedd and
his wife Mary.
When Savige and Petros met up with the
fleeing hordes most of the Assyrian soldiers dispersed to look after their own
families and interests, leaving the DUNSTERFORCE team to organise the fighting
withdrawal against the Turks and Kurds, along with the few Assyrians prepared
to soldier alongside them. Captain
Stanley George Savige MC was to receive a Distinguished
Service Order: For conspicuous
gallantry and devotion to duty during the retirement of refugees from Sain
Kaleh to Takan Tepeh, also at Chalkaman, 5th to 6th
August. In command of a small party sent to protect the rear of the column of
refugees, he by his resource and able dispositions kept off the enemy, who were
in greatly superior numbers. He hung on to position after position until nearly
surrounded, and on each occasion extricated his command most skilfully. His
cool determination and fine example inspired his men, and put heart into the
frightened refugees.
Captain Eric George Scott-Olsen, 56th
Battalion Australian Infantry, received a Military
Cross: For conspicuous gallantry and
devotion to duty at Sain Kaleh, Persia, on 6th August 1918, while assisting in
covering the retreat of a party of refugees when the rearguard was heavily attacked.
He held on to position after position, checking the enemy's advance. Heavy
fighting lasted for six hours, during which he withdrew his party 15 miles
while inflicting severe losses on the enemy. It was largely due to his courage
and determination that the defenceless party were brought through safely.
A
Bar to the Distinguished Conduct
Medal was awarded to 1764 Serjeant B. F. Murphy DCM, 28th
Battalion Australian Infantry: For marked gallantry and leadership at Sain
Kaleh. He was one of a small party
covering a retirement, and by his courage and initiative in using his Lewis gun
beat back determined enemy attacks. When his party were practically surrounded
be gave his horse to a wounded officer and got away successfully with his gun
on another. He showed splendid courage throughout.
The Distinguished
Conduct Medal was awarded to the New Zealander 34906 Serjeant A. Nimmo, 3rd
Battalion the Otago Regiment: For
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Sain Kaleh on 6th August, 1918.
He was with a small party detailed to cover the retirement of a column, and was
left behind to bring the transport out of a village. He and another N.C.O. beat
off a determined enemy attempt to capture the mules. Throughout the fight for
fifteen miles he worked Lewis gun and rifle continuously.
Savige’s team lost one man killed in action
at Sain Kaleh, Captain Robert Kenneth Nicol MC, 2nd Battalion The
Wellington Regiment, New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Robert Nicol exposed himself to enemy fire
whilst gallantly attempting to save the mules which enemy snipers were picking
off. His body could not be retrieved
from the battlefield.
When the DUNSTERFORCE team was being hard
pressed at Sain Kaleh Savige sent a messenger back to Bijar requesting
support. The messenger was met by a
patrol of 14th Hussars who immediately rode to assist. The patrol commander, H/47485 Serjeant A.
Hallard, 14th Hussars, received a Distinguished
Conduct Medal: For conspicuous gallantry and
devotion to duty north of Sain Kaleh on 6th August 1918. While in command of a
patrol he intercepted an urgent message from another party hard pressed by the
enemy. After dispersing the enemy threatening his flank he led his patrol to
this now exhausted party and relieved them. He displayed great promptitude and
determination under trying circumstances.
The firepower of Albert Hallard’s patrol pushed
the Turks and Kurds back, allowing the refugee column to limp into Bijar on 17th
August, but 30,000 Assyrians had been killed, captured or abandoned since they
fled from Urmia. Also lost on the
journey was the fighting American Doctor William A. Shedd, who died of cholera
whilst treating the many sick refugees. During
the march to safety the Assyrians looted and destroyed every Persian village
that they passed through, leading to the DUNSTERFORCE team having to apply
violent disciplinary measures to reduce these incidents.
At Hamadan the Urmia Brigade was
established and able-bodied male Jelu volunteers were enlisted into its four
battalions, under the supervision of DUNSTERFORCE instructors; two battalions
were Assyrian and the other two were Armenian.
The remainder of the refugees marched down to a camp at Baqubah,
Baghdad, the privations of this journey killing even more of them.
Above: Persian labourers construct the road through the Asadabad Pass
Turkish
movement forward from Tabriz
On the 20th August Lewis
Wagstaffe reported from Mianeh that Turks were advancing from Tabriz, where the
Turkish 11th Caucasian Division was believed to have recently
concentrated. This was unwelcome news as
the enemy’s intentions could have been to disrupt the British line of
communication between Mesopotamia and the Caspian Sea. Wagstaffe had a platoon of 1/4th
Hampshires and 650 levies with DUNSTERFORCE instructors forward of the Kuflan
Kuh ridgeline; in the rear at Zenjan there was the by now weak squadron of 14th
Hussars and 50 rifles of 1/2nd Gurkhas.
Reinforcements for Wagstaffe were sent from
Kasvin on 21st and 22nd August. The artillery component consisted of a
section each from the 44th and C/69th Field Batteries that
had come up from Mesopotamia, and a section of 21st (Kohat) Mountain
Battery. The infantry troops despatched were
100 more rifles from the Hampshires and 50 more from the Gurkhas. British air reconnaissance verified an enemy
advance to Yusufabad, whilst a British intelligence report indicated that the
Turks also proposed advancing from Sauj Bulag on the two roads through Saqqiz
and Sain Kaleh. This intelligence
assessment led to guns and infantry from 39th Brigade being held
back at Hamadan and Kasvin, and this fact was to lead to a refusal of immediate
reinforcements for Baku at the end of the month.
North
Persia Force
As Dunsterville was now in Baku with a
small tactical headquarters General Marshall appointed Brigadier General A.C.
Lewin CB CMG DSO to command all troops south of the Caspian Sea. Lewin took over the DUNSTERFORCE main
headquarters at Kasvin and commanded all operations in north-western Persia,
reporting directly to Marshall. By a
subtle stroke DUNSTERFORCE had been emasculated and the fall of Baku to the
Turks had been ordained. But the real
punch below the belt was that Marshall did not send staff officers from Mesopotamia
for the new headquarters; thus when DUNSTERFORCE was fighting for survival in
Baku and Dunsterville was desperate for more staff assistance he could not move
his main headquarters forward to Baku as planned, as the men he needed were no
longer under his command. That decision
was now Lewin’s and Lewin answered to Marshall.
On 31st August Lewin, his task achieved, handed over his new
command, titled North Persia Force, to the commander of 39th
Infantry Brigade, Temporary Brigadier General H.F. Bateman-Champain CMG, 9th
Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army.
The
fighting along the Tabriz-Kasvin Road
On 5th September up to 2,000
Turks advanced from Yusufabad and engaged the British observation screen at
Tikmedash. The British screen was
commanded by Wagstaffe’s second-in-command a DUNSTERFORCE officer named Captain
H.E. Osborne, 2nd King Edward’s Horse, and for his actions over the
next three days Herbert Edward Osborne was awarded a Military Cross: For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to
duty during a retirement from Tikmedash to Mianeh on 5th-7th September, 1918.
He conducted the withdrawal of his small command in face of strong enemy forces
over a distance of 55 miles in a most skilful and cool manner. He caused the
enemy many casualties, and eventually brought his force through to safety with
comparatively few losses.
Osborne, who had previously reconnoitred up
to the outskirts of Tabriz, had under his command locally recruited levies,
stiffened by ‘C’ Squadron 14th Hussars (60 sabres) and small
detachments of Gurkhas and Hampshires.
When the Turks used artillery against Tikmedash the levies soon became
demoralised and fled, as did the local mule train drivers who cut the loads
loose and rode off on the mules. The
Medical Officer Captain Jordan Constantin John, Indian Medical Service,
attempted but failed to stop this flight although he did manage to evacuate the
wounded, and he was later appointed Officer
of the Order of The British Empire(OBE).
During the withdrawal from Tikmedash 1032 Lance
Naik Sherbahadur Ghale, 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, displayed gallantry
that earned him an Indian Distinguished
Service Medal. Osborne’s next fight
was at Turkmanchai a day later and here he was supported by the two mountain
guns that had come forward; the mounted enemy unsuspectingly rode within range
and suffered from accurately fired shrapnel shells. Here 4848 Lance Naik Bahadurman Rai, 1/2nd
Gurkhas, also won an Indian
Distinguished Service Medal.
Osborne’s troops, now joined by Guy McCleverty who had reinforced him
with 100 Gurkha rifles, reached Mianeh on 9th September. Here Claud Matthews had come forward to take
command from Lewis Wagstaffe. A further
withdrawal was made to a defensive position at the pass over the Kuflan Kuh
ridgeline. Throughout the withdrawal
from Tikmedash ‘Darkie’ Pope’s ‘C’ Squadron 14th Hussars had fought
continuously as the rearguard, and it was due to the Hussars’ professionalism
that the Turks were held back, allowing the infantry to make clean breaks from
the fiercely-fought actions.
The defensive position on the Kuflan Kuh was
strong in artillery as the 18-pounders and the howitzers were in support along
with a platoon of the 9th Battalion the Worcestershire Regiment, but
with only about 60 sabres and 300 rifles there was insufficient infantry for
Matthews to defend the feature satisfactorily.
After repulsing a very determined enemy attack, during which his levies
again fled whilst the Worcesters saved the day with a bayonet charge forward
from their reserve position, Matthews ordered a withdrawal back to Zinjan. Here the situation stabilised as the Turks
had by now appreciated the firepower of the British artillery and of the armoured
cars that had engaged them on the Zinjan road.
Commonwealth War Graves Commission records suggest that two Serjeants of
the Hampshires and two Gurkha riflemen were killed as the British pulled back
from Tikmedash to Zinjan; all the British wounded were evacuated.
Captain R. Goldberg, Machine Gun Corps
Motors, had been prominent in operations against the Tabriz Turks. Reuben Goldberg was awarded a Military Cross: For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to
duty. Owing to his skill and ingenuity, a howitzer was brought from a distance
of twenty-four miles into action against the enemy. On another occasion he
carried out a reconnaissance over difficult country under fire, and brought
back valuable information.Reuben had previously fought in armoured
cars in German South West Africa (now Namibia), and German East Africa (now Tanzania)
and he was soon to be also awarded a Distinguished
Service Order.
Left: Lt Gen Sir RW Marshall
Conclusion
to Part 1
Hopefully what has been written so far sets
the scene for the second part of the narrative that will describe events in
Baku and around the Caspian Sea. Only
the major actions resulting in gallantry awards have been described in this
first part, but there were many more incidents when DUNSTERFORCE levy
commanders and Hussar patrols engaged both Turkish-inspired hostile tribesmen
and gangs of bandits attempting to seize loot and females. Probably the full story of all these actions
will never be told.
But the important fact, which was
conveniently forgotten by the detractors who chose at the time to judge
DUNSTERFORCE operations as having failed, is that in northern Persia
Dunsterville and his excptional team achieved a remarkable success. Once the plan to reach Tiflis was abandoned
DUNSTERFORCE, utilising extremely limited resources, achieved the new mission
of denying enemy movement through north-western Persia whilst securing the road
from Mesopotamia to the Caspian Sea. General
Hew Fanshawe, an honourable man who was never afraid of standing up to military
authority on behalf of a deserving subordinate, was the only senior officer who
appears to have appreciated the intricacies and complications of operating in
neutral Persia; he commented objectively and accurately on DUNSTERFORCE’s
success in northern Persia and on what was needed at Baku.
Endnote:
This account has concentrated on military
actions at the expense of the concurrent international political activities,
but anyone wishing to learn more of the intriguing political situation in the
Caucasus and Transcaspia in 1918 will find a very readable and entertaining
account in Peter Hopkirk’s Like Hidden
Fire. The Plot to bring down the British Empire.
SOURCES: (the most easily accessible
publications are listed)
Moberley, Brigadier General F.J., Official History.The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918, Volume IV. Imperial War
Museum and Battery Press reprint.
Moberley, Brigadier General F.J., Official History. Operations in Persia
1914-1919. Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office. Facsimile Edition 1987.
Jones H.A., The War in the Air, Being the Story of the part played in the Great War
by the Royal Air Force, Volume VI.
Naval & Military Press reprint.
Farndale, General Sir Martin, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery.
The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base 1914-18.
The Royal Artillery Institution 1988.
War
Diary of the 14th (The King’s) Hussars 1918-1919. Museum of Lancashire, Preston, UK.
Stewart, Alan, Persian Expedition. The Australians in Dunsterforce. Australian
Military History Publications 1961.
Russell, W.B., There Goes a Man. The Biography of Sir Stanley G. Savige. Longmans
1959.
Ford, Roger, Eden to Armageddon. World War I in the Middle East. Weidenfed & Nicholson 2009.
Burke, Keast (editor), With Horse and Morse in Mesopotamia.
The story of ANZACS in Asia.
Available on-line through www.ozebook.com
Arslanian, Artin H., Dunsterville’s Adventures. A Reappraisal. International Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 12, No. 2 (September 1980) pages 199-216.
Townshend, Charles. The
British Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq 1914-1921. Faber and Faber, London 2010.
Hopkirk, Peter, Like Hidden Fire. The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. First Published as On Secret Service East Of Constantinople byJ. Murray 1994.
Gokay, Bulent. The
Illicit Adventures of Rawlinson. (This
is a revised version of the paper presented in the Seminar on "Spying in
the Ottoman Empire", the Skilliter Centre for Ottoman Studies, Newnham
College, Cambridge, 29 April 1995.)
Available on internet.
Gokay, Bulent. The
Battle For Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode In The History Of The
Caucasus. Turkish Year Book, Volume
XXV 1995, pages 21-45.
Above: A British officer from the Dunsterforce watches a Russian instructing a group of Persian police at Resht
Above: Map of important locations in the Caspian region
Command of the British Mission was given to
Major General Lionel Charles Dunsterville CB.
He was a well-liked and respected Indian Army officer and a fluent
Russian speaker, with operational experience on the Indian North-West Frontier
and in China. As Dunsterville states in
his account of DUNSTERFORCE, the name by which his mission became known: ‘My own
knowledge of the Russian language and known sympathy with Russia had probably a
good deal to do with my selection for the task’. His mission was: ‘the maintenance of an effective force on the Caucasus front so as to
protect the occupied portions of Turkish Armenia and to prevent the realisation
of Pan-Turanian designs’. The then British Military Agent in Tiflis was
Lieutenant Colonel G.D. Pike MC, 9th Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army, and
Dunsterville was to take over the appointment from him.
Right: Stanley George Savige DSO MC when a Subaltern
Left: Lt Gen Sir RW Marshall