When war was declared in August 1914 British East Africa
(BEA), now Kenya, was immediately threatened by military aggression from the
adjacent colony to the south, German East Africa (GEA), now Tanzania. The indigenous regular troops in BEA were the
King’s African Rifles (KAR) who were nearly all deployed on the northern and
eastern borders with Abyssinia and Somalia. In any case the KAR, although a formidable
force against tribal insurgents and cattle thieves, was not equipped or
supported to tackle military operations against another European power.
The BEA Governor, Sir Henry Belfield, sent a telegram on 4th
August to the Colonial Office (1) describing the defenceless condition of his Protectorate. India
was considered to be the guardian of the British Protectorates in eastern Africa, and in all previous emergencies (2)
Indian troops had been dispatched to supplement the various Protectorates’
forces. The Colonial Office turned to India for military support, but India was by this time also arranging support
for operations in France and
Belgium
and she referred the request to the Committee of Imperial Defence. This Committee formed a sub-committee titled
the Offensive Sub-Committee which immediately addressed the East African
situation.
On 5th August a recommendation was made to send
an Indian Expeditionary Force to attack Dar Es Salaam,
the GEA capital located on the Indian Ocean
coast. The following day saw a further
recommendation made to dispatch another Indian force of two, quickly increased
to three, battalions to safeguard internal security in BEA. Both recommendations were approved and
implemented. The Dar Es Salaam expedition, later diverted to
Tanga, was named Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’, and the second Indian
expedition to BEA was titled Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF) ‘C’.
The composition
of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘C’
Army Headquarters in India received its instructions for
the two forces on the 8th and 9th August and acted
immediately. Colonel J.M. Stewart CB ADC
was appointed to command IEF ‘C’. The 29th
Punjabis, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.B.H. Drew, was allocated to IEF ‘C’
and two Imperial Service battalions from the state forces of Bhurtpore, Jind,
Kapurthala and Rampur were also allocated; each princely state provided a
half-battalion. The 27th (Bengal) Mountain Battery joined the Force. An oxen-drawn artillery battery of the
Cossipore Artillery Volunteers with six 12-pounder guns was allocated (3),
as was the pack-mule Indian Volunteer Maxim Gun Company (4). Ancillary units were also added.
Above: 29th Punjabis in the KAR lines, Nairobi,1915
By 19th August Headquarters of IEF ‘C' (5),
the 29th Punjabis, a Section of 120th Field Ambulance, a
Second Class Post Office, a detail from the Military Accounts Department and a
Field Supply Post had boarded the transport SSNairung at Karachi which sailed for
East Africa. The Punjabis were by now
urgently needed as German units were attacking across the southern BEA border.
Above: The upper Tsavo Valley
The 29th
Punjabis embark and deploy
The 29th Punjabis, located in Hyderabad,
Sind, was initially warned to prepare for the European theatre but that order
was altered to read East Africa. The 29th was a Class Company Regiment
containing 4 companies of Sikhs, 2 companies of Dogras and 2 companies of
Punjabi Mussalmans. The battalion was
brought up to war strength by a draft of 250 men from the 30th
Punjabis which had an identical class composition; 3 British and 3 Indian
officers and 4 buglers accompanied this draft from the 30th
Punjabis. The battalion entrained on 16th
August and after a 7 hour overnight journey reached Karachi the following morning to embark on SS Nairung.
Reaching Mombasa on 1st September the Punjabis
were split in two, battalion headquarters and two double companies with the two
battalion machine guns entrained for Nairobi with HQ IEF ‘C’ whilst the other
two double companies went up the Uganda Railway line only as far as Voi, less
than a third of the distance to Nairobi (6). West of Voi the Tsavo River
valley ran up to the border with GEA.
The valley was covered in a dense bush of thorn-trees and the only
routes in it were game trails made by animals.
Nevertheless the valley was an attractive route eastwards for German
raiding parties because of the abundant water supply in the river bed. By now KAR companies and BEA Volunteer units
were already intercepting German intrusions from across the border.
The Voi party, 8 Indian officers and 351 sepoys of Numbers
II and III Double Companies, 8 Regimental Scouts under Havildar Wazir Singh and
the section of the Field Ambulance, was commanded by Major A.A. James. The British officers with him were Captain
H.T. Skinner, Captain J.A. Pottinger (30th Punjabis attached) and
Lieutenant C.E.U. Bremner. Each man
carried 400 rounds of ammunition; 14 days rations were sent to Voi after being
unloaded, but all the battalion horses went to Nairobi to avoid the diseases prevalent in
the Voi area. The only information given
to Major James was that small isolated enemy parties were attempting to attack
the railway line.
James detrained at Voi during the hours of darkness and
set up camp nearby. He learned that an
armoured train was being constructed in the Nairobi
railway workshops and it would soon appear to help defend this stretch of the
railway, and that a strong blockhouse was being built to guard the vital Tsavo River
rail bridge, 50 kilometres north-west of Voi.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Punjabis detrained at Nairobi where Colonel Stewart was promoted to Brigadier
General and placed in charge of all troops in BEA and Uganda. The British officers with Colonel Drew were
Major G.W. Haslehurst, Captains H.A. Murray and Captain W.K.P. Wilson (both 30th
Punjabis attached), Captain C.R. Cleaver, Lieutenants G.N. Bignell and H.R.
Stranack, 2nd Lieutenant E.K. Bird and the Medical Officer Captain
J.V. MacDonald, Indian Medical Service (IMS).
Nine Indian officers, 1 Sub-Assistant-Surgeon, IMS, and 384 sepoys
comprised Numbers I and IV Double Companies at Nairobi.
The KAR had laid out a camp in preparation for the Punjabis’ arrival.
Initial
operations in the Voi area
The German commander at Moshi, just west of the GEA-BEA
border south of Mount Kilimanjaro, had sent out
a small detachment under Lieutenant von Oppen on 27th August with
orders to “destroy or interrupt the railway and telegraph line at Tsavo”. Two days later in the area between Mzima and
the Rombo River von Oppen successfully ambushed a British mounted infantry
party of Abyssinians and Somalis that was accompanied by local Masai tribal
auxiliaries. Von Oppen had not taken
casualties but he realized the vulnerability of his small party and so he
halted and asked headquarters at Moshi for a machine gun and
reinforcements. Captain Hans Schulz and
his 13 Field Company – over 200 Askari with 4 machine guns – came and took over
the von Oppen mission on 1st September. Schulz moved cautiously forward through very
dense and difficult bush down the Tsavo
Valley.
On 3rd September a small 1st (Nyasaland) KAR observation post at Mzima Springs was
engaged by Schulz’s men and the KAR Askari under Lieutenant R.C. Hardingham
withdrew eastwards. On getting this
news the following day Major James, now commanding all troops in the Voi area,
moved the bulk of his troops to Tsavo and ordered detachments outside the
valley to move closer in an attempt to trap the enemy party. It has to be said that at this stage of the
campaign the Punjabis had no concept of local tactical conditions and
considerations, particularly the time needed for messages to be passed by
runner through thick bush, but Indian Army officers took control of operations
because of their seniority. This often
dismayed the KAR officers and Askari who understood the reality and savagery of
close-contact bush warfare.
Above: Thick bush in the Tsavo area
On 5th September James ordered Captain Skinner
to advance up the valley with two companies; Skinner met Hardingham withdrawing
and it became Skinner’s opinion by nightfall that the Germans were now east of
him, having slipped past in the thick bush.
On hearing this James ordered Skinner to turn around on 6th
September and attack the Germans from a flank.
In fact Schulz was still west of Skinner and trailing him. As Skinner’s sepoys left a low ridge the
Germans occupied it and took the Punjabi rearguard by surprise with rifle
fire. A brief fire fight started and a
group of 4th (Uganda)
KAR under Lieutenant G.C.O. Oldfield joined in.
German machine guns came into action and Oldfield was soon killed whilst
8 of his Askari were wounded. It is
quite probable that these 4th KAR Askari held the line whilst the
Punjabis regrouped.
Naik Gul Mohamed brought up reinforcements to support the
rearguard, and he, Subadar Sher Baz, Captain Pottinger and a few sepoys charged
an enemy machine gun. Gul Mohammed was
twice wounded and Sher Baz attempted to recover him, but Sher Baz was himself
severely wounded whilst in this act and he died soon afterwards. When trying to deploy in the thick bush many
sepoys became totally disorientated and lost.
Pottinger, assisted and doubtless guided by a 1st KAR party
under Lieutenant C.G. Phillips, enfiladed the German right flank, forcing
Schulz to abandon the ridge. The German
commander then withdrew having completed one of his tasks. A British follow-up was considered to be
impractical at that moment, especially as the Punjabi machine guns were
elsewhere.
Above: The railway bridge over the Tsavo River
Killed along with Subadar Sher Baz were: Sepoys 4324
Mahomed Din; 3711 Mirza Khan; 4811 Mahomed Zaman; 4968 Ghulam Hussein (all of
‘F’ Company); 4504 Amrita (‘C’ Company);
and 4396 Dido (‘D’ Company). Eight
sepoys were wounded; they were stretchered back to Voi with the wounded Askari
and then moved by train to Nairobi
where they were treated in the civil hospital (7).
Three gallantry awards were later made for the action in
the Tsavo Valley:
Military Cross:
Captain John Ashton Pottinger, 30th Punjabis, (his first of two in
this theatre). The citation cannot be
located.
Indian Order of
Merit (IOM) (2nd Class): 4050 Naik Gul
Muhammad and Subadar Sher Baz (posthumous award). These were the first awards of the IOM in the
Great War and the citations read: Naik Gul Muhammad. For the conspicuous resourcefulness and
pluck displayed by him during the action at Tsavo River, British East Africa,
on the 6th September 1914, in bringing up reinforcements, in the
course of which he was twice wounded.
Subadar Sher Baz. For conspicuous courage and gallantry during
the action at Tsavo River, British East Africa, in attempting, though wounded
himself, to drag under cover Naik Gul Muhammad of the same regiment who was
severely wounded. During this brave
attempt to save a comrade, Subadar Sher Baz lost his own life (8).
Battle-inoculation into East African conditions had
started for the 29th Punjabis, but there was still much to learn
about this hot, wet, densely-vegetated, fever-ridden theatre where as well as ferocious
bayonet-wielding German Askari, carnivorous animals and snakes could suddenly
attack whilst jigger-fleas burrowed under men’s toenails and incapacitated
them.
As a consequence of the Tsavo action Colonel Drew brought
Numbers I and IV Double Companies and the machine guns down from Nairobi to
Mackinnon Station, located 65 kilometres south-east of Voi. However the now-concentrated battalion was
immediately divided into small detachments guarding railway stations and
bridges, whilst other parties garrisoned Tembo in the Tsavo
Valley, Kasigau Hill to the south, and
other locations such as Bura on the trade route south of the Tsavo Valley
that ran from Taveta to Voi. This route
had no rivers on it, but the Germans quickly established and replenished dumps
of water in the thick bush en route, allowing their patrols to reach the
railway line with relative ease. The
Punjabi signalers were located in small detachments on high features to
maintain a heliograph system on sunny days, which were now becoming less
frequent.
By the end of September the 29th Punjabis,
headquartered at Tsavo, had adopted the 8-single company system and company
locations were:
·
‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies at Magadi Junction,
south-east of Nairobi, where a branch line ran
west to Lake Magadi, near the GEA border. ·
‘C’ and ‘F’ Companies at Tembo in the Tsavo Valley. ·
‘D’ Company at Tsavo Bridge. ·
‘E’ Company and the two machine guns at
Mazeras, 25 kilometres from Mombasa. ·
‘G’ Company en route to Gazi, on the
coast 35 kilometres south of Mombasa. ·
‘H’ Company at Bura, 32 kilometres
south-west of Voi.
The arrival of
the remainder of IEF ‘C’
In early October 1914 the remainder of IEF ‘C’ arrived
bringing two reinforcing drafts for the 29th Punjabis. Captain E. Edwards, Subedar Rai Singh and 73
Rank & File arrived from the 29th Punjabis’ Depot, whilst
Captain T.R.H. Keppel, Lieutenant N.L. Mitchell-Carruthers, Subadar Waryam
Singh, Jemadar Alla Ditta and 81 Rank & File arrived from the 30th
Punjabis’ Depot. As a result of the
arrival of the Imperial Service infantry units many of the garrison locations
on the railway line were handed over by 29th Punjabis, but on the
coast at Gazi ‘E’ and ‘G’ Companies and the machine guns were in contact with a
German force probing towards Mombasa. One sepoy was wounded during this
contact. As October developed the 29th
Punjabis were warned to be ready to form a Flying Column (8)
and half of the battalion began to concentrate again in the Nairobi and Kajiado areas.
The action at
Longido in support of the landing of IEF ‘B’
The
landing place of IEF ‘B’ had been changed from Dar Es Salaam to Tanga, a port just south of
the GEA-BEA border. IEF ‘C’ planned an
operation from the border post of Namanga, south of Kajiado, towards Moshi
designed to draw German troops away from Tanga at the critical time. However the British had not correctly appreciated
the usefulness to the enemy of the German Usumbara Railway that ran from Moshi,
where most of the Schutztruppe (9)
was located, down to Tanga on the Indian Ocean
coast. The German theatre commander,
Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, was to make maximum use of this railway as he
reacted to the Tanga landing. A British
breach of this line would have been the best support that IEF ‘C’ could have
given to IEF ‘B’.
Instead General Stewart decided to attack the German posts
on Longido Mountain which lay 20 kilometres south
of Namanga and well north of the Usambara Railway terminal at Moshi. This was a reasonably healthy area for the
troops, although short of water sources, and the ground was rolling and open
allowing for good use of mounted infantry.
Colonel Drew was placed in charge of the operation and the troops
allocated to him were:
·
Four companies, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘D’ and ‘H’, of
The 29th Punjabis (10). ·
Four companies of The Kapurthala
Infantry. ·
Two Sections (4 screw guns (11))
of the 27th (Bengal) Mountain Battery. ·
One Section (2 Machine Guns) of the Indian
Volunteer Maxim Gun Company. ·
Five Squadrons of The East African
Mounted Rifles (EAMR), a BEA wartime Volunteer unit. ·
A Detachment of Masai Scouts, a BEA
irregular wartime unit. ·
Elements of 120th Indian Field
Ambulance. ·
100 mules to carry water in tins.
British intelligence believed that the enemy had around
200 German white troops and up to 300 Askari on and around Longido Mountain. In fact the German commander, Major Georg
Kraut, had Numbers 10, 11 and 21 Field Companies and Number 9 Schutzen Company (12) under command, a total of 86 Europeans, 583 Askari and 6 machine guns.
After making a reconnaissance Colonel Drew decided upon a
three-pronged attack. The Decisive
Attack Column, which was the main body under Major Haslehurst, was to attack up
the eastern face of the mountain to destroy the enemy troops camped there
whilst a holding attack was mounted against the northern face, and a third
column was to seize a known water source on the southern slopes. Like most military plans it could have worked
but the enemy interfered with it.
The Tanga landing of IEF ‘B’ had been planned to take
place on 3rd November, so on the preceding night Colonel Drew’s
three columns marched out from Namanga.
The holding attack column consisted of three EAMR squadrons, a
Kapurthala single company and a section of mountain guns, and was commanded by
Major H.S. Laverton, EAMR. At first
light when the column approached the north face it was met with accurate
machine gun fire from an estimated four German guns. Laverton did not feel like risking casualties
in a dismounted attack and so he remained bogged-down until late afternoon when
he withdrew on his own initiative to a spur on the route back to Namanga.
The third column, two EAMR squadrons under Captain A.C.
Bingley, had difficulty in finding the water source and the enemy was alerted
to its presence. It found the hidden
spring by observing German troops riding up to it, but when Bingley’s men
advanced enemy firepower was concentrated upon the EAMR troopers both from the
area of the spring and from the rocks above it.
Bingley lost eight men killed and two wounded who had to be left behind,
and he withdrew on his own initiative to Namanga (13).
Only Major Haslehurst’s Decisive Attack Column got
anywhere near achieving its objectives.
Colonel Drew’s force headquarters accompanied this column. Mountain warfare was something that the
Punjabis understood, and they advanced well up the mountain accompanied by
three companies of Kapurthalas, two mountain guns, the two Indian Volunteer
Maxims, the field ambulance sepoys and the mule convoy. At first light Haslehurst thought that he was
on a dominant ridge, but thick mist impeded his view and in the mist a Punjabi
patrol blundered into a German picquet, alerting it to the British
presence. As the mist lifted Haslehurst
saw that he was not on dominant ground and that enemy troops were advancing to
attack him. A successful Punjabi counter-attack
halted the enemy, but the firing stampeded the mules down the hill and the
column was without water.
In the afternoon a strong German attack forced back the
two forward companies, but this was again halted by a vigorous Punjabi
counter-attack. By then Colonel Drew
could see Laverton’s men riding away from the action and he realized that he
was on his own and in a precarious position without water. At dusk a final enemy attack was beaten back
and a night-time fighting withdrawal commenced down the mountain side; problems
were compounded by panic setting-in amongst the Followers (14). However the Punjabi rearguard fought well
supported by the two Maxim gun teams (16). Colonel Drew marched his force back to
Namanga having lost one British officer (17),
nine EAMR troopers and nine sepoys killed, and one British officer (18)
and 32 sepoys wounded; two sepoys were missing.
German casualties were reported as five Europeans and 11 Askari killed
and five Europeans and 19 Askari wounded, but Georg Kraut retained possession
of the mountain and all the water sources.
The attack on Longido had failed, as co-incidentally had the attack of
IEF ‘B’ on Tanga. British morale fell to
an extremely low ebb (19).
Above: Longido Mountain from Namanga
Ironically, if a giraffe had not knocked down the German
telephone line between Moshi and Longido Colonel Drew would have found Longido
vacated. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had sent a
message to Kraut ordering him to march to Moshi and entrain for Tanga – but the
giraffe prevented that message from reaching Longido. Georg Kraut stayed put and won a battle of
his own.
The remaining
weeks of 1914
In mid-November Kraut’s force withdrew from Longido and
dug-in at Engari Nairobi, a location 50 kilometres closer to Moshi. When Masai scouts reported this Major
Haslehurst took a column back down to Longido and occupied the mountain. The Punjabis began to concentrate their
battalion again at Namanga and Longido, supported by machine gunners from the 2nd
Battalion The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (20),
and from the Indian Volunteer Maxim Gun Company. The EAMR and the Punjabis continued to patrol
the area but so did the Germans who were aggressive wherever possible. Meanwhile back in Hyderabad,
Sind, Captain C.W.J. Smith took over command of the 29th Punjabis’
Depot from Captain J. Campbell, and commenced moving the Depot to Delhi.
1914 drew to a close with several sepoys suffering from
either scabies or jigger fleas under their toe nails; the latter was probably
caused by the men when off-duty walking barefoot around their locations. The King-Emperor sent a greetings telegram on
Christmas Day. Colonel Drew and his 29th
Punjabis prepared for a new year of operations against a tough, determined foe
in a theatre where the terrain, vegetation and climate demanded constant
vigilance plus high levels of physical fitness and stamina. A challenging time lay ahead.
(An edited
version of this article has appeared in a recent edition of Durbar, the journal of the Indian
Military Historical Society: http://imhs.org.uk/ )
Above: The inscription of Sher Baz IOM on the Nairobi B&I Memorial
SOURCES: (most economical shown)
Hordern, Lieutenant Colonel Charles. Official History, Military Operations East Africa
August 1914 – September 1916. (Battery Press, Nashville 1990.)
29th
Punjabis War Diary, August to December 1914. (WO95 5340).
Duckers, Peter. Reward
of Valour. The Indian Order of Merit 1914-1918. (Jade Publishing, Oldham
1999.)
Paice, Edward. Tip & Run. The untold tragedy of the
Great War in Africa. (Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, London 2007.)
Wilson, C.J. The
Story of the East African Mounted Rifles. (Leonaur paperback 2006.)
Head, Richard and McClenaghan, Tony. The Maharajahs’ Paltans. A History of the Indian
State Forces (1888-1948), Part I.
(Manohar, Delhi 2013.)
Hart’s Annual Army
List 1915.
[1] At this time the Colonial Office was responsible for all matters in
East Africa; the War Office only provided
officers to serve with locally recruited formations.
[2] BEA, Uganda,
British Central Africa (later named Nyasaland and now Malawi) and British
Somaliland had all benefited in the past from support provided by
Indian troops.
[3] This battery was commonly known as the Calcutta Volunteer Battery.
[5] Colonel
Stewart, his Brigade Major Captain J.G. Cadell, 45th Rattray’s
Sikhs, and Aide-de-Campe Lieutenant Kassim Shah.
[6) Voi is around 360 kilometres from Nairobi, and the rail journey between the two
locations took over 12 hours.
[7] One week later Major James was admitted to hospital in Nairobi and the following month he was detached to become
Base Commandant; in December 1914 he escorted German prisoners to Bombay.
[8] Subedar Sher Baz IOM is commemorated on the Nairobi British and
Indian Memorial in the Nairobi (South) Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery.
[9] A Flying Column moved rapidly without being encumbered by a
slower-moving administrative tail.
However Flying Columns could only quickly react to situations and could
not stay on operations very long, as supplies, water and ammunition soon ran
out.
[10] The name for a local German colonial force.
[11] ‘C’ and ‘F’ Companies were at Tembo in the Tsavo Valley
and ‘E’ and ‘G’ Companies were at Gazi on the coast.
[12] Mule-packed 10-pounder guns that could be broken down into single
mule loads. The barrels could be
unscrewed into two pieces.
[13] Field Companies each contained up to 200 Askari and 20 Germans
whilst Schutzen Companies were composed only of German or Austro-Hungarian
reservists (or seamen stranded in GEA).
The Schutzen Companies varied considerably in strength.
[14] Two of the EAMR troopers were later awarded Distinguished Conduct
Medals.
[15] Unarmed non-combatants who nevertheless had important tasks to
perform such as carrying ammunition and equipment or driving mules.
[16] Two of these Volunteer machine gunners were later awarded
Distinguished Conduct Medals.
[17] Captain H.H. Sandbach, EAMR, who was acting as a staff officer with
the Decisive Attack Column.
[19] After Longido many disillusioned EAMR troopers received the
permission of the Governor, who was outspokenly anti-war, to return to their
farms and civil occupations.
[20]
This battalion, in IEF ‘B’, was the only British infantry unit in either of the
IEFs. When IEF ‘B’ sailed away from
Tanga it docked at Mombasa
where all its troops were merged with IEF ‘C’.
Instead General Stewart decided to attack the German posts
on Longido Mountain which lay 20 kilometres south
of Namanga and well north of the Usambara Railway terminal at Moshi. This was a reasonably healthy area for the
troops, although short of water sources, and the ground was rolling and open
allowing for good use of mounted infantry.
Colonel Drew was placed in charge of the operation and the troops
allocated to him were:
